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WHY HAVE SO MANY CRITICS ACCUSED THE
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OFFICER
CORPS OF FOSTERING CAREERISM?

SOME THOUGHTS?

by

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AMERICAN OFFICERS AND CAREERISM

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought
HAMLET

INTRODUCTION

We in the military officer corps have become particularly sensitive to charges that our profession fosters careerism. What is this "careerism"? Why are we so charged? This paper will attempt to assess some of the reasons for the spate of such accusations and the directions from which they come. No attempt will be made to justify or refute a charge of careerism. Each officer must reach his own decision in this regard.

CAREERISM?

"There exists an unwholesome amount of irresponsible criticism of the implementation of our national military policies. The more vociferous of critics aim their slanderous attacks at our military leaders. The continued degradation of career military officers as a class can do irreparable damage to our ability to attract and retain capable personnel. Able and conscientious men will not indefinitely continue in a profession dishonored by public criticism." (8:1953)

Right on! The author of these words obviously is concerned with our efforts to create a volunteer armed forces. He also shows sympathy for career officers in the

face of current criticisms levied against our profession. This undoubtedly strikes a responsive chord in many of us. Interestingly, the author of the above remarks was the "Womble Report" of 1953, which resulted from a Department of Defense study of the "Future of Military Service as a Career that will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel." Although the term careerism per se was not used in the Womble Report, it may be that the word had not yet come into vogue, for the professional integrity of career military officers was certainly in question by our critics. From this we can deduce that current accusations of careerism directed against military officers are not a new phenomenon. What then of this word careerism.

Webster defines it as "the policy or practice of advancing one's career (as in the arts and professions) often at the cost of professional or personal integrity: career building as a deliberate aim." Others have defined a careerist as: "one who consistently places his own personal advancement above the best interests of the profession. One who sacrifices dignity and loyalty for advancement."

Like all words or descriptive phrases, the meaning is in the eye of the beholder -- or in how it is perceived by an individual. For example careerist is often used colloquially to refer to a person who is a "lifer", or who has decided to make the service a career. Careerism is the noun which

seems to have the odious meaning. Does it make a difference which values are used to measure professional integrity? I believe that it does. Anthony Wermuth has compared the values characteristic of American Culture with those of small units of the Army. Note the differences in the two lists. (11:)

VALUE CLUSTERS GENERALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF AMERICAN CULTURE

1. Activity and work
2. Achievement and success
3. Moral orientation
4. Humanitarianism
5. Efficiency and practicality
6. Scientific and secular rationality
7. Material comfort
8. Progress
9. Equality
10. Freedom
11. Democracy
12. External conformity
13. Nationalism and patriotism
14. Individual personality
15. Racism and related group superiority

MILITARY VALUE FACTORS IN SMALL UNITS OF THE ARMY

1. Social background of unit members (e.g., homogeneity, heterogeneity)
2. Personality of unit members
3. Protectiveness of immediate leaders
4. Performance of immediate leaders
5. Military discipline, professionalism and role of soldierly honor
6. Commitment to one's social-political
7. War indoctrination
8. Exigencies of military life and the combat situation
9. Replacement system and rotation policy
10. Technical aspects of weapons systems
11. Social prestige of profession
12. Egalitarian practices within the military organization

These values are not necessarily in order of importance.

Additionally, comparison of the values of small units (or

group values) in the Army with individual values of our culture may seem to be mixing apples with oranges. However, (whether we agree with the values listed or not) I believe that these lists demonstrate some differences between ourselves and our civilian counterparts. What does all this have to do with careerism and the spate of critics who accuse the contemporary American officer corps of fostering careerism. Simply this: a critic who accuses the service, or a particular officer, of careerism often is quite naturally using his own value system as a yardstick. The same group, or officer, by military values may be acting as a professional with no taint of careerism. I don't mean to imply that some members of our profession do not advance their careers at the cost of professional integrity. I do believe that we have become too thin skinned when criticism or cries of careerism are heard from outside our organization, e.g., civilians. We must be aware that different measurements may be in use to define professional integrity.

To a journalist, professional integrity may demand that you immediately and publically denounce any cost overruns on a military procurement contract. To a senior officer involved in management of the contract, professional integrity may demand that you try like hell to prevent the cost overruns while insuring that your superiors are kept well informed -- but not that you pull a Gordon Rule.

Our confrontation with the journalists during last year's "Military and the Media" seminars of the Naval War College dramatically illustrated to me the sentiment of many, that the professional officer corps fosters careerism. Although I don't recall the term careerism being used, the message clearly came through that we were thought to be lacking of professional integrity. Conversely, I believe that we illustrated to the media representatives that their professional integrity was also in serious question. Unfortunately the media is not the proper opponent for us to exacerbate. On the positive side, I believe that each of us (the media and the military) became a bit more aware of the value system in use by the other.

The current criticism directed against us as professional officers undoubtedly stems from a myriad of factors. Changing socio-politico mores in our society, the Vietnam War, and the move to an all volunteer armed forces to name but a few.

A number of scholars and military men have expressed concern, lest the all-volunteer military return to a modern version of the 1930's "From Here to Eternity" military: isolated from society, unresponsive to civilian influences, and structured along caste lines. Such a military, many feel, is incompatible with democratic society. (6-18) In such a military, the inner elite is made up of those whose military experience conformed most closely to the professional ideal, i.e., those who had gone to the Academy,

been to the Staff College, had the proper assignments, etc. (3-18)

The charge of careerism, in part, may stem from ideological differences. For example, Samuel P. Huntington compares liberalism with the military ethic. He considers individualism as the heart of liberalism and that it emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposes political, economic and social restraints upon individual liberty. In contrast, he feels that the military ethic requires the individual to be subordinated to the group.

(5:90) This seems to be consistent with the point in Wernuth's study in comparative values. Huntington goes farther, and examines the reform criticism of the military, and reports that "military standards of honor, obedience and loyalty were adjudged either hypocritical or positively dangerous." "Absolute obedience to orders", wrote Ernest Crosby, the most prolific anti-militarist of the muckraker period, "involves, of course, the abdication of conscience and reason." In sum, Huntington feels that the reformers viewed military professionalism as economically wasteful, socially useless, and ethically backward. (5:292) This point may be illustrated by certain segments of liberalism, particularly the literary field and communications media, which seem to be united in their hostility to the military profession.

Another source of the criticism stems from the increasing disaffection of young people from government in the late 1960's focused particularly on the uses of violence, which took some of the most promising young leaders of the country by assassination, and involved many others in urban riots or foreign combat. The military establishment and the police, as symbols of officially condoned force, became primary objects of this alienation.

(12:405)

This alienation has taken many forms with which we are all familiar. Draft evaders, a hostile press, Senator Fulbright, Jack Anderson, George McGovern, and of course, our own Cy Bunting, to name a few. Professor Bunting probably expresses the feeling of a number of the alienated in his recent book The Lionheads. The principal characters in this book clearly illustrate a lack of professional integrity, and an abundance of careerism. For example, "It is his sensing of his standing in the eyes of men like these (high ranking contemporaries) that ultimately dictates his selection of options." Thus does Bunting describe General Lemming. (l-19) "Not only are his staff afraid of him and anxious to advance their own careers; they are also tired." (l-21) "They lack the courage to point out what has gone wrong." "The professional world runs on patronage; the professional army is no different." (l-54)

Undoubtedly there are many truths in The Lionheads and Cy Bunting has done a good job of painting the black black. Disagreement with politico-military perspectives gives officers an opportunity to select themselves out as Yarmolinsky notes. (12-224) Undoubtedly some officers with strong reservations about U.S. policies in Vietnam -- like Bunting -- have selected themselves out. In turn, officers who fit in with official doctrine of their service are most likely to rise. Here is the real crunch for the professional officer. What does my professional integrity demand? We are all interested in advancing our careers, yet we must look ourselves in the mirror each morning.

The implications of "cover up" in the My Lai affair, the Army General who sold government weapons for personal gain, the story of the marine cutting an ear off his dead adversary, and many other stories of the Vietnam War period have provided ammunition to our critics. Many major news stories implied careerism and these stories seemed to breed others as journalists sought to outdo each other on their expos's of military misdeeds. (Is that journalistic careerism?) Gloria Emerson of the New York Times is one of the more prolific such authors. As a matter of interest she continues her offensive in an article in the April 1973 issue of Harper's, in which she implies that the officer corps, as a group, are latent homosexuals who love blood and war. As to the latent homosexual charge,

I would offer to prove it false, but that is truly above and beyond the call of duty (at least for Gloria Emerson.) As to the love of blood and war, I fear that Miss Emerson may have seen "Patton" once too often. In any event, it must be admitted that, properly or improperly, the Vietnam War tarnished the prestige of the military officer corps and further added to charges of careerism.

Certainly not all criticism has come from outside the military. Captain W. R. Thomas, USN has commented on the habit of officers to withhold criticism until retired. Since I can't improve on his words, they are quoted:

"Military officers normally have weepy pens. It is part of the equipment issued to them when they are first commissioned so they can contradict arguments of (1) senior officers when caught in irrational acts; (2) foreign merchants, when dunned; (3) civilian officials, when issued trivial directives; (4) wives, when at sea; (5) foreign policy analysts, when writing notes to editors; or (6) congressmen, who want their constituents transferred.

"This graceful art eventually results in the acerbetic flood of timeless prose which retired flag officers release as a long damned torrent of abuse after they leave the service. It is then, and only then, that they unveil their 'What's Wrong with the Army/Navy/Air Force/Marines/Coast Guard' epics -- the 'Why We Failed at (in) the African/Italian/Mexican/Korean/Boxer Campaign' stories -- and today, of course, those new dramas titled 'How the President/Defense Department/Military/Republicans/Democrats/Communists/Allies Caused Us to Lose the War/Peace/Economic Leadership in Kashmir/Vietnam/Outer Space/Antarctica.

"There are, admittedly, tedious and trivial administrative obstacles which discourage these officers from writing controversial articles while they are on active duty; but these deterrents are

not meant to be repressive. It is, therefore, surprising to note that the sarcastically constructive suggestions which many retired general officers subsequently reveal to their former colleagues and civilian leaders were singularly lacking when they were on active duty. For some reason their literary minds only started to function after their braid was removed. (9-8)"

The symptoms so eloquently described by Captain Thomas were undoubtedly intensified during the 1960's. Referring to the McNamara era, Vincent Davis reports that many officers used the term "reign of fear" to describe the situation under which they worked, charging that those of their number who were imprudent enough to differ or dissent with the views of the Secretary as new policies were being hammered out, no matter how loyal they might be to his policies once established, found their professional careers severely jeopardized if not terminated. (2-237) The firing of Admiral Anderson as CNO is but one example, and undoubtedly the professional integrity of other senior flag officers soon became more flexible.

Few among us have not bent ideals a bit under certain circumstances. For many of us the key seems to be to fall back upon some pivotal or basic values. For example, most of us won't lie, steal, cheat or kill to advance our careers. However, most of us are guilty (if that is the correct word) of some careerism in that we do try to advance our careers as best we can. I find this wholly consistent with our profession -- as well as with every civilian occupation.

Careerism is present in varying degrees in the military and civilian spheres. It exists in business, in the universities and colleges, in all forms of the communications media, and probably most apparently in the political processes of our nation.

SUMMARY

Careerism means different things to different people. We in the military have become hyper-sensitive to charges that we foster careerism, in part because we attach Webster's odious meaning to it, and in part because of basic ideology differences with our critics. There are a myriad of reasons for the charges levied against us, but the changing socio-political mores in our society, the Vietnam War, and the move to all all-volunteer force are probably foremost among them.

R. B. Gard, writing in Foreign Affairs, states that the military profession faces what is probably the most difficult challenge in its history in pursuing two key and sometimes conflicting objectives: providing for the military security of the United States and accomodating present values of American society. Along with providing a flexible military force relevant to political realities, the armed forces must maintain an organization which is sensitive and responsive to change. (4-703) Whether adaptation to change will ever completely quell accusations of careerism, however, seems unlikely.

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ONE ADVERSARY TOO MANY
(STRATEGY MAKING UNDER THE 1969-1974 NSC SYSTEM)

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by

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(Strategy Making Under the 1969-1974 NSC System)

Prologue

The officer finished his two-and-a-half minute statement to the attentive group in the gold carpeted, well appointed conference room in the offices of the Joint Staff. His voice broke at the conclusion of his impassioned final plea. One was unconsciously reminded of the prestigious and historic record of the U.S. Navy, somehow reflected from the four gold braided stripes and stars on the sleeves of the perfectly tailored uniform. As he raised his hand to eyes beginning to well with tears, he straightened his shoulders and looked toward the head of the long, highly polished table.

The presiding officer, a distinguished looking general, rose, and said, "Thank you, gentlemen." I closed a carefully indexed and tabbed legal sized plastic covered notebook, handing it to one of three Army lieutenant colonels seated directly behind me. They, in turn, gathered books, papers, and data displays, and as they packed an assortment of oversized briefcases, I shook each one's hand, thanking them in turn. "Good job, Gary; thanks for coming, Frank; Don, you've done a great piece of work. Don, we need to have this wrapped up first thing in the morning for the OPSDEP." "Right ...Congratulations." I turned to my colleagues at the table -- a proud and, we believed, a professional group -- professional representatives of each of the Services and professional negotiating adversaries. We shook hands all around, "Good argument;"

"Sorry about that comment . . . ;" "We've worked a good paper." "Good night." We were Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine "Planners" and our Chairman at the meeting had been a general officer from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were adversaries on every occasion that we met -- two to three times a week. We were also Officers and Gentlemen, careful to maintain a certain decorum at these ritual sessions with a view toward enhanced efficiency and added luster to our common perception of professionalism.

Within minutes, I was alone outside the Pentagon -- on my way to North Parking, and home -- 15 minutes away in Alexandria. It was 3:00 a.m., a cool spring morning in 1971, a little more than two years into the first term of the Nixon Administration. I reflected on a job "Well Done." My colleagues and I had just succeeded in substantially narrowing a set of strategy and force issues to be addressed by the OPSDEPS -- The Operations Deputies (Lieutenant Generals/Vice Admirals) -- of the four Services, in their regular sessions preparatory to the next meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps, I thought, the issues had been worked to the point where the matter would not have to be raised for debate in the "tank" among the Chiefs -- probably the OPDEPS could finalize the paper -- the JCS would in that case merely be informed of the arrangements reached to take action in their name. Good, I thought, we've helped take some of the load off the Chiefs -- particularly, my own -- the Chief of Staff of the US Army.

Then I thought, what happens next? How will this paper ultimately be turned into action? How many more hurdles will there be? Have we used the right timing, the best bureaucratic route to achieve what is best for the Army? For the national security interest?

Questions of this sort were the bread and butter of the Army "Planners" -- the "Three Wise Men," three colonels on the Army Staff with the title of Assistant Directors of Plans, who between us "worked," reviewed and made recommendations on every paper or "action" in the JCS system. Some "actions" were finalized by telephone vote at our level, some were JCS approved as a result of a "planners", like the session just described. Others would require OPSDEPS addressal -- many would go to the "tank" where a consensus among the Chiefs themselves would emerge. This is the system -- an adversary system -- which in turn is part of a wider adversary relationship used to address strategy and forces under the NSC. There are no votes in the system. There is argument. There is a sharpening of the issues. There is constant negotiation -- both formal and informal -- much of it "behind the scenes." The big issues are addressed by the President, sometimes after consultation with the National Security Council. Many issues are decided at the next lower level -- as a result of work prepared for a set of committees -- all of them chaired by Henry Kissinger -- the Under Secretaries' Committee, the Defense Planning Review Committee (DPRC), the Verification Panel (VP), the Washington Senior Action Group (WSAG), etc. A great

many actions are taken by lower level consensus in inter-agency working groups which are in more or less continuous session - the DPRC/WG, the VPWG and many other ad hoc groups. There are no formal rules. There is a structure for work - National Security Study Memoranda/National Security Decision Memoranda (NSSMs/NSDMs) -- leading to decisions through which some control is exercised. But personalities, other forces, and the realities of the moment often wrest control from the established system. Sometimes the system itself kills a decision.

Purpose

This paper is about how the strategy system operates and how it might work better - in particular how we, as Armed Forces officers, might best contribute. The system relates to outside forces and adversaries, including our Allies and opponents. However, the actors of most direct interest to us work in the following adversary arenas:

- The inter-agency NSC organization
- The Department of Defense strategy and policy hierarchy
- The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Service Staffs

The Nixon Approach to Strategy

The Nixon approach to the strategy problem has two aspects which became apparent immediately after the Administration took office in 1969. These were organizational, and substantive in character.

Nineteen Sixty-Nine was a year of transition. A new organization for national security strategy implementation was quickly established with its roots in the Old Executive Office Building of the White House complex. A greatly expanded staff began to manage work for the National Security Council and the subcommittees associated with it. The organizational change was revolutionary with respect to inter-agency dynamics. In order to fit to the new system most effectively, the Dept. of Defense should have made some correspondingly revolutionary organizational adjustments. However, not many such compensating measures have been taken. In 1974, the Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) are still largely organized to react to the leadership and philosophy of the 1960s.

The substantive aspect of the new Administration's approach was also sketched rapidly. One of the first National Security studies led to the early decision in 1969 to change our overall strategic concept from the "2-1/2 war strategy" of the 1960s to a "1-1/2 war strategy." The "Nixon Doctrine" surfaced and was then refined in the NSC system so that the Administration was in a position to develop the main directions of a foreign policy for the 1970s in a comprehensive written report to the Congress by February 1970.

The report divided the Nixon strategy for peace into three areas of endeavor. They are:

- Strength
- Partnership, and
- Negotiation

Clearly, OSD and OJCS should have rapidly adjusted their framework for planning to adequately treat each of these new policy tracks and relate each one to the other. In 1974, the Dept. of Defense is thinking and working hard to implement initiatives related to all three of these elements of the "Nixon Doctrine." However, the giant DOD organization has still not been adequately tuned to fully tie together the strength, partnership, and negotiation threads of our strategy policy.

As we broke into the 1970s, everything about the strategy making of the past decade had changed. Signals were sent out to supplement written policy pronouncements and major strategic decisions. A strong pulse read that the Nixon Administration wanted to more effectively use military advice within the structure of the new NSC decision making system and in the substance of the Nixon strategy for peace.

In the 1960s there was a concerted and successful effort to tighten civilian control over our military establishment. With a reduced say in how forces were to be used, the military staffs were turned inward and their energies channeled to the task of more or less equitably dividing the available resources among the Services in such a way that each retained the most flexibility possible to do what might be required by higher civilian authority. Military men became force oriented. During this process, management in OSD became systems oriented, as opposed to having a strategy/policy focus. Thus, papers in the Pentagon in the 60s were written about numbers of divisions, airplanes, and aircraft carriers and about the development and costs of highly

sophisticated weapons systems. Not too much was thought or written about strategy; how these forces and things might - or should be used, or if they should be used at all.

Certainly, the current swing of the pendulum will never take us back to the philosophy of the 1940s -- when, for example, no one bothered to tell the Secretary of State that we were going to invade North Africa -- or to the 1950s -- the era of Eisenhower, Bidell Smith, Marshall, Taylor, McCloy, Gruenthaler, and MacArthur. But the 1970's heralds a period of significant readjustment.

After more than ten lean years (not in terms of money but in terms of participation in the policy making action) the Military Establishment is poorly prepared bureaucratically and psychologically to do the strategy job it has been asked to do under Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Richardson, and now Schlesinger. We have in uniform an overkill in PHDs and MAs in international relations -- that is not our area of weakness. The problem is that we are living in the past.

This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1950's we had "avant-garde thinkers" espousing 1939 "blitzkrieg" doctrine. In the 1960's we spent some considerable effort to construct a corps of "soldier-statesman" more appropriate to the demands of the 1950s. In the 1970's "forward thinkers" are working on counter-insurgency and operations research/systems analysis to be ready for the 1960's.

We also have a few men in uniform today who are intent upon worrying over the military role; fighting to have a voice instead of organizing better to play the expanded policy role that has been offered the Military Establishment. These men are agonizing over the problems of the past and are missing the opportunities of the present.

I see little danger that military views will go unregarded in our Government. The danger I see is that old fashioned organization and procedure combined with outdated thinking will paralyze the decision making process.

The Working Level NSC Organization

The working level in the NSC system is usually made up of representatives of the NSC staff, the Dept. of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Each Agency has at least one voice, if not one vote. In some theoretical sense one would expect each to speak to an area in which it had expertise and bureaucratic responsibility. Often this is not the case -- in fact, it is usually not the case. Defense and JCS representatives wax eloquent on diplomatic tactics and arms control negotiation -- CIA men hold the floor expounding military tactics. State Department experts take a big hand in military force structure discussions, and ACDA likes a bit of everything. The NSC staff has carte-blanche to cover the waterfront and is burdened with a certain sense of overall responsibility for every aspect of military, economic and diplomatic planning.

The lines of responsibility are confusing and often amusing. In the early days of the current Administration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was represented by two different agencies -- ISA (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) and SA (Systems Analysis). Frequently, these two agencies took different positions on issues in interagency discussion. Today, this trend has diminished as a result of a mellowing of OASD-PAE (Program, Analysis and

Evaluation) -- the successor organization to SA (the "enfant terrible" of the McNamara era) OSD now seeks to speak with one voice. However, if PA&E bureaucrats don't like the sound of that voice, they have been known to lobby directly among other agencies to insure that their independent views are heard. This tactic is, of course, used by every agency in Washington.

The Joint Chiefs representatives have little difficulty speaking with one voice from an agreed position - in fact, they are given little leeway to drift from what has been approved by all four Services. The State Dept. is usually represented by a covey of officers speaking for a variety of agencies. It is conceivable that representatives of State's Office of Political Military Affairs, a Regional desk, the Counsellor's Office, the Policy and Planning Staff, the Office of Intelligence and Research and assorted supporters might all contribute different views on the same subject. Being trained diplomats, they always carry this off with a polish that is the envy of other agencies.

State is now feeling the bureaucratic benefits of having Mr. Kissinger as their Secretary, particularly since he has brought a number of staffers from the NSC with him to the Department. At the same time, the NSC Staff is in the process of adjusting to this change and clarifying its bureaucratic lines of authority. NSC staffers might invoke the position of the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) only to be told by State staffers that the Secretary of State (Kissinger) doesn't feel the same way about the issue.

ACDA has a starting disadvantage in that it is a small agency with limited bureaucratic staff support, no overseas representatives, a title with "Disarmament" prominently displayed therein, and an ambiguous relationship with the Dept. of State. At the same time, one of the three pillars of the President's foreign policy -- negotiation -- depends heavily on ACDA for structural and philosophical support. Their representatives have to work extra hard and be extra careful.

The CIA can sit back without worrying too much about operational policy responsibility, but at the same time they must be ready to bear the blame in case anything goes wrong. Their position seems to be one of "honesty is the best policy," and they try to tell it like it is. They work rather well with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Excellent papers and information are routinely made available by the two. They go much further on occasion and have sometimes taken some lead in making policy.

Each of these agencies naturally holds some suspicions about the others from both a bureaucratic point of view and a theological perspective.

The JCS representatives are viewed by some as having a political stance to the right of Ghengis Khan, and inflexible military minds focussed on building a bigger military machine. ACDA staffers are characterized by some as pinko fellow-travellers willing to trade national security for just about anything. The others are catalogued

somewhere in-between and are probably viewed as being soft on either the fascist militarists or on the pacifists, but unwilling to take a firm position on anything -- except to join a consensus -- as long as we don't anger our Allies, our opponents, or the NSC staff.

Each agency has constituents to worry about. State has an infinite number of bureaus plus "The Ambassador" overseas whose views must be taken into account. The Dept. of Defense can herald an even greater number of bureaus and agencies plus the "commanders in the field." In addition to a general unspoken reference to the salvation of all mankind, ACDA falls back to invoking their Director. The NSC staff doesn't hesitate to allude to the interests of their chief constituent -- The President.

Though there is a certain sense of competition among them, the players all have lofty goals and good motives. They are sometimes stubborn in maintaining an agency position but are generally thoughtful and flexible men ready to find grounds for adjustment which is in the overall national interest. Some have more influence on the judgment of their agency superiors than others. Some have more influence on their adversaries than others.

Power and influence in the interagency arena derives from the same sources as it generally does elsewhere:

First, and most important, a very detailed and thorough knowledge of every aspect of the subject at hand.

Next, a full understanding of the intricacies of the bureaucratic state of play of the issue.

Third, a willingness to do more than one's agency's expected share of the dirty routine study and work for the use of the group as a whole, and

Fourth, an understanding of how to use one's negotiating capital, i.e., using your big guns or "stone-walling" rarely when absolutely necessary.

These levers of power are also used by a wide variety of individuals outside the Government who seek to contribute to the development of U.S. strategy for one reason or the other. It may be true that there are more defense intellectuals outside the Government than there are in it. Certainly, a good many have the time (and are willing to use it) to know a great deal about the subject and the issues. Not so many have easy access to an understanding of the current state of play. A good many are willing to do the leg work and research to crank out "real world" papers and ideas that are of some use. Some have an entree for using negotiating capital in certain circles to give their views added impact. This set of actors constitute another array of adversaries in the national strategy process.

They include confidants of high officials, members of the press, lecturing and writing professors, miscellaneous pundits, employees of "think tanks" and even foreign governments. Whether or not we could or should do

without any of these extra-governmental contributions is not at issue. They may constitute one adversary too many, but they are with us - all in the adversary process - invited or not.

OSD Organization for Strategy and Policy

Today the NSC related strategy/policy function is split at least four ways within OSD. Some of it is handled directly in the private office of the Secretary of Defense by the Assistant to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and other personal advisors and assistants to the Secretary. Some of the task falls to the Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation. The JCS, of course, have a profound responsibility in this regard, but a "chicken - egg" situation fogs the issue. Should the JCS write limited strategy based on guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense - or should the civilian leadership develop strategy after having received recommendations from their military advisors? Currently, both these alternatives prevail because the bureaucracy is still operating a system constructed for the 1960s and at the same time making ad hoc responses to the new realities of the 1970s. The result is sometimes inadequate or confusing military staff support for the Joint Chiefs and for the Secretary.

The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs has the prime bureaucratic responsibility for interface with the NSC strategy system but currently does not have adequate control, largely because of the somewhat ambiguous situation associated with the four-way split for strategy development within the Department.

The strategy issues are generally presented by the NSC staff in a straightforward, simple manner. "What should be our strategy and planning forces for Europe?", for example. The answer is never simple. And getting an agreed Department of Defense answer is never a simple process. A minimum of 3 adversaries are involved at the DOD level in producing it.

A remarkable aspect of the problem is that it is rarely, if ever, possible for DOD to draw upon an established position or an existing cell of the staff to provide the necessary material. The strategies, plans, and even the data that are being routinely produced by the bureaucracy cannot be readily applied to the "real world" represented by NSC study requirement. This is not to say the bureaucracy is in a state of chaos. It just hasn't adjusted quickly enough to the new approaches.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report prepared in 1970 did not highlight the need for the Department of Defense to manage strategy and policy. The authors focussed on the issue of adequate civilian control of operations and freeing the Joint Chiefs of some of their workload. The Panel recommended a reorganization of the Defense Department with Deputy Secretaries for (1) Management of Resources; (2) Evaluation; and (3) Operations - with no one holding the overall brief for strategy and policy. Though the intent of the recommendation was to free the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform as "principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense" the net affect of such a structure could be to shelve the Chiefs out of the strategy/policy main stream.

Since the current Nixon approach involves (1) construction of adequate US military forces ("strength"), (2) coordinating policy and force interface with our Allies ("partnership"), and (3) the conduct of international negotiations, the Office of the ASD(ISA) ties together all the DOD strategy and policy participation in the wider NSC fora. In practice, a loose ad hoc team is formed between ISA, PAE, and the Joint Staff to address each issue that comes up. Under the present system, if ISA doesn't actually coordinate DOD strategy, it doesn't get done.

JCS Organization for Strategy and Policy

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel implied that the JCS were bound up by procedural restraints, could not act effectively, and that the Joint Staff process militates against the likelihood of the Chiefs clearly resolving potentially divisive issues. There is some truth to a part of this. However, the work of the JCS is divided into two basic categories: (a) operations and (b) plans, policy, and strategy.

The same set of problems does not apply equally to both these categories. Admiral Moorer, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has said that he has no problems with rapid, effective operational decisions in times of crisis. Command and control of our forces through the JCS/NMCC system is the least of our troubles. This is, in fact, where we have the greatest strength in the national security system. Of all functions, this one should be tampered with the least -- assuming some streamlining of our unified commands.

The weaker link in the JCS system is the part that deals with plans, policy, and strategy. It is here that there is a risk that committee-type negotiations could reduce major strategy issues to a level of compromise which as the Blue Ribbon Panel suggested, might "either avoid the potential conflicts or substitute a solution that can be accepted on a quid-pro-quo basis."

In any case, it is here where the military connection to the NSC system tends to break down. The key JCS strategy/policy document is the voluminous JSOP (Joint Strategic Objectives Plan).

Volume I of the JSOP is the strategy volume. During the 1969-1974 period I have never known anyone involved in the NSC strategy process to refer to Volume I of the JSOP. This means that something is wrong with the system. The JCS are, of course, involved in making NSC strategy - but on an ad hoc basis - not through the JSOP. The effect is that the nation does not have the full benefit of a complete coherent military evolution of strategy.

The bulk of the JSOP specifies the objective forces needed to carry out the Volume I strategy. The Services have a terrific interest in the force volumes. In the 1960s when military strategy advice was not in high demand, the numbers of divisions, airplanes, and aircraft carriers specified in the JSOP (although greater than we could actually afford to buy) provided the basis for a balance and interrelationship of our various types of forces. Today, the tie-in of JSOP force books to the real world NSC strategy is tenuous at best.

On the other hand, some most important force decisions - from a strategy point of view - are made outside of the JSOP. Part of the NSC system of European strategy decisions developed in 1970 called for converting "tail" or "fat" into "teeth" or enhanced conventional combat capability. The Army followed through vigorously on this decision and has, since 1971 in fact, created the equivalent of more than a brigade of combat forces in Europe out of whole cloth - at no cost in additional manpower. This was done completely outside the JSOP main stream. Today, the Chief of Staff of the Army is cutting more "tail" and indications are that our combat punch worldwide could be increased from 13 to possibly 14 divisions - a far more realistic force to meet our "real world" strategy requirements.

This increase in combat capability is also being generated at no cost in additional manpower. The mechanism for getting it done is again outside the JSOP structure.

The point is that under the present system, the link between national policy/strategy and force construction is being forged (1) through ad hoc arrangements or (2) through personal interaction by a few men at the top more than it is by the military and civilian bureaucracy. This is better than nothing but it is not efficient use of the Defense staff.

Important elements of policy can "fall through the crack" where there is no established bureaucratic "back-up" machinery to follow-up on the ad hoc process.

The military bureaucracy is not geared to fully interrelate the three pillars of the current strategy. The "Partnership" and "negotiation" pillars are hard for the Joint Staff to link to the "strength" pillar, which is the focus of the JSOP. The Army (and I'm sure the other Services) does look at these three pillars as a coherent whole, but they begin to diverge as they are worked through the JCS and OSD and I would argue that they may never come back together again in the way they should.

In 1969 and 1970, I made a low-level effort to link the "partnership" work being done under the JSOP rubric to the NSC process then underway. There was at that time a big stack of JSOP books that analyzed the forces of our Allies and suggested how these forces could be improved in our interest and in the interest of our Allies - through military assistance and other means. It seemed logical to put the Army staffers - and eventually the Joint staffers - who worked this part of the JSOP into play on the National Security study as it pertained to "partnership" with Europe. This turned out to be bureaucratically impossible. It was argued that the JSOP books did not exactly fit what we were doing - more importantly, the necessary effort could not be diverted because JSOP deadlines had to be met.

Again, I must say that I haven't found anybody in the national strategy business who knows about or makes use of the "partnership" set of JSOP books. I suspect that they don't even play much of a role in the on-going military sales and assistance actions managed by the Dept. of Defense. This constitutes inefficient use of the Defense staff and our valuable manpower resources.

The third pillar of our current foreign policy is "negotiation." The operative negotiations bearing on our most central strategy interest - Europe - are the talks which have just begun in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). MBFR is far more than a negotiation about today. It is a political/military process that will have profound effects on our national strategy and the future of European security regardless of the outcome of the talks. The Plans and Policy section of the Joint Staff includes an element responsible for JCS participation in this process. This cell is not linked directly to the JSOP structure - nor should it necessarily be. It is essential, however, that some measures be taken to insure that Dept. of Defense contributions to the negotiating thrust of national policy be very closely tied to our DOD strategy/policy mechanism - as it is in the NSC arena.

Other Forces that Affect the NSC System

This paper has discussed the basic structure of the NSC system and the Dept. of Defense structure that contributes to it.

Some additional outside forces impact on the decision process. These include:

- (1) The research and development/equipment manufacturing process;
- (2) The people;
- (3) Economic fluctuations; and
- (4) The Government bureaucracy.

For example, the ad hoc strategists may wish to emphasize conventional warfare capabilities and doctrine, but elements of the scientific and research community may force, or seek to force, nuclear innovations on the system - suggesting that strategy be built around them. The Davy Crockett was actually pushed into our inventory more than ten years ago just because it was there not because it matched doctrine and strategy - which it in fact did not. Today the capability to develop improved "mini-nucs" is generating a head of steam and influencing strategic thinking along lines in opposition to the system which is seeking to build a strong conventional strategy. Even conventional weapons like the CHEYENNE and the MBT 70 (Main Battle Tank) have a way of taking over and becoming forces unto themselves regardless of how they fit into a strategy, or how they steal resources from other elements that may be more essential to a certain strategy. Fortunately, these two systems were killed before they spun completely out of control. But other systems are ready to rule if given half a chance. Strategy logically yields to technological advances such as the stirrup, gunpowder, the airplane, the atomic bomb, etc. but that is quite a different thing from permitting evolutionary weapons development get control of policy.

The people keep a watchful eye through the Congress on weapons development matters but sometimes it pushes a less than optimum system because it means jobs. This factor also makes it difficult to consider non-US products which might be cheaper, or better suited to the thrust of a given strategy.

The Congress also influences strategy policy in more fundamental ways. For example, they have exerted meaningful pressure with regard to troop deployments around the world - Europe in particular.

Economic fluctuations may influence force development more than strategic planning. For example, important programs might be cut at times when budgets must be trimmed for short term economic adjustments and, conversely, last minute increases to the budget may be implemented in order to prime a sluggish economic trend.

With such forces at work, one cannot help but wonder how much impact strategic thought can actually have on the nuts and bolts of construction of a force structure.

Perhaps the biggest drag on strategy decisions is the bureaucracy itself. There are so many experts and special interest groups within the Government that see peril in change that it is almost beyond belief. The weight of the bureaucracy can ultimately prevent decisions from being carried out - usually this is done unconsciously - (a) because some element of the bureaucracy doesn't know about the intent of the larger decision, or (b) because the bureaucracy is a moving train that no man can stop and few can divert. Sometimes, the effort to block policy in the national security strategy area is quite intentional. In the olden days this was called insubordination. Today, the system is so big it often goes unnoticed or gets chalked up to ignorance or inefficiency.

With a mass of vertical and horizontal obstacles to overcome, one is left with the overall impression that our system of adversary strategy and policy development has one adversary too many.

How the Strategy for Europe has Developed

The "planners" meeting in early 1971 where we began this quick tour of the adversary system marked the culmination of one and a half years of intensive effort to develop a U.S. approach to Europe. We thought at the moment that the "European security equation" was close to solution. Today we know better.

It all began in late 1969 with a NSSM signed by Mr. Kissinger, in the name of the President, which directed that the government develop an strategy approach with regard to Europe.

Everyone knew that the change in the overall strategic concept from 2-1/2 to 1-1/2 wars implied some matching reductions in the baseline general general purpose forces (Army, Navy, and Air). All the adversaries in the NSC system therefore girded to (a) protect their interests against unwarranted cuts or (b) to make sure cuts were made, and, (c) to hammer out a force and strategy match that was in the national interest. The "one" in the 1-1/2 wars that we were worried about was Europe. Thus, we had to find out how we could best tackle such a conflict -- and more important, what kind of posture and forces we and our Allies should construct in order to deter it in the 1970's. Asian strategy details would logically be addressed later.

On the Army staff we were well prepared when the President's study directive reached us through the Chairman of the JCS. We had just studied and thoroughly staffed a proposed solution to the European strategy problem. The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief, and all the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff had met a number of times in executive session and personally finalized the details of a new program for Europe for the 1970's which had these essential features:

- A more realistic assessment and measurement of the conventional balance in Europe.
- A program for inspiring confidence in our Allies that an improved conventional defense could be attained.
- A program for specific force improvements without increasing manpower in order to gain a credible conventional defense.
- A reduction of overhead and streamlining of the U.S. forces in Europe in order to improve efficiency and combat capability.
- Further study with our Allies of the possibility of some limited specialization and redefinition of roles among the forces in the Central Region.

The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff were keenly aware of the economic, political, and manpower constraints under which we and our Allies would be operating in the 1970's. Their program for Europe was detailed, complete, and geared to the realities of this decade. As

a next step the Army needed to fit its ideas for Europe with the overall force structure.

A small group was closetted in a suite in the subbasement of the Pentagon, under the close supervision of the Army's Director of Plans and the personal guidance of the DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations). We undertook to mesh the European strategy concept with our overall general purpose theater force requirements. The situation which was most demanding was in NATO, and we had to have enough U.S. Army divisions and Allied conventional forces to be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack and there to sustain our deployed forces and those of our Allies. We computed this on the basis of the views of commanders in the field, war games, the terrain, the potential enemy, Allied contributions, potential improvements, and other critical factors.

There were, however, important and powerful elements on the Army Staff which addressed the problem more from the budget and programming point of view. A long battle ensued within our own service over the absolute minimum number of divisions. Thus, the adversary process had advanced beyond the European question at the Army level by the time we received the President's order in December 1969 to work that problem.

The Army did not, and does not, have a seat at the interagency table. Our first hurdle was to get the Army's program for Europe even listed on the agenda being developed by "action officers" working the problem for the JCS. This is to say nothing of the problem of then getting the agreed joint staff positions into interagency play.

Military advice on strategy direct from the Chief of Staff of the Army was difficult, if not impossible, to get surfaced to the civilian leadership. There are two types of military advice which can be particularly useful to the national leaders. First is the detailed information and knowledge that only service "action officers" (majors/lieutenant colonels/ commanders) have at their fingertips on certain subjects. Second is the broader wisdom and judgment on strategy and policy matters available only from the senior officers of services -- and the Chiefs themselves. The JCS system routinely prevents both these categories of military advice from surfacing. Service "action officers" are not permitted into the interagency councils, and surrogate Joint Staff officers must do their best to present the facts.

On the other hand, important positions become firmed up at the service and joint staff "action officer" level and are put into the NSC system at very high levels without the benefit of refinement resulting from more senior military in-depth analysis and judgment.

Let me mention tangentially that in 1970 the President had also asked the NATO Alliance to work the Europe problem -- with U.S. participation, of course. This was called the AD-70 study (Alliance Defense in the 1970's). To make a long story short, the adversary process ground on in Washington and abroad during most of 1970.

Throughout, we in the Army continued our internal battles, travelled overseas to win over the commanders in the field, presented our basic case to almost every agency in the government, and still kept arguing to keep our foot in the Joint Staff arena. Although the basic problem was one of land warfare, the JCS system required concurrence from Navy,

Marine Corps, and the Air Force "action officers" in every word that went from the Pentagon into the inter-agency milieu.

The military view was then chiseled at by analysts who attempted to quantify with minute precision every element of the European security equation. We labored for weeks to expunge what we viewed as faulty (and sometimes amateurish) perspectives from the studies -- only to find the same points reintroduced in the next round. U.S. "think-tank" types appeared on the scene with their own studies and ideas which largely ignored most of the work done by official Washington. Not only did we hear from our own "think-tanks", but foreign governments weighed into the Washington process with their own stable of analysts. There was no shortage of advice and "expertize". The outsiders set up lobbies which attempted to go directly to all the separate agencies within and outside the Pentagon in order to make headway for their own theories, which ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous.

Strategy and forces are, after all, everybody's business. The planning of troop levels and weapons systems must meet the larger political requirements of the nation. However, in the 1970 development of the strategy and force papers for Europe, deliberations over the conduct of the land battle, Army force structure and organization, and relative weapons capabilities were carried on regularly among at least 8 agencies' representatives, only one of whom was a uniformed member of the armed forces (a rear admiral). All kinds of alternatives were examined. Volumes of studies were produced. Finally, just before the December 1970 NATO

Ministerial meetings, the National Security Council met and assessed the options. The President then signed off on a NSDM which laid out a decision with regard to our European strategy approach. It put into motion a program essentially the same as the one developed internally by the Army exactly one year before.

The NATO studies (AD 70) had reached similar conclusions as a result of transatlantic coordination and specified "important areas in NATO's conventional defense posture to which attention should be paid in the next decade," including armor/anti-armor potential, the air situation including aircraft protection, the peacetime deployment of ground forces, and further improvements in Allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities.

President Nixon sent a message to the NATO ministers which said, "We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not only be maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. Given a similar approach by our allies, the United States will maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is a reciprocal action from our adversaries. We will continue to talk with our NATO allies with regard to how we can meet our responsibilities together."

To this point the strategy process had lurched rather inefficiently to a sound conclusion despite itself. Decisions had been made; a plan of action outlined. Many adversaries had been overcome in the process. Many adversaries had made useful contributions. Some adversaries had just slowed things up. But, the toughest adversary was yet to be confronted -- the national and international bureaucracy.

The JCS and Systems Analysis drew on the President's instructions

to produce a paper we would use to go to our Allies with specifics as to how we should, as the President had said, "meet our responsibilities together." A detailed and excellent Pentagon plan outlined in 150 pages of charts, tables, and prose was in turn, carefully reviewed in the interagency area, and dispatched to our U.S. Mission to NATO with White House blessing. It then died a natural death.

This plan never fit exactly with what the force planning bureaucracies in NATO, in Washington, and in other national capitals had underway. Therefore, this critical step in U.S. strategy formulation never received the boost it needed to achieve the best affect. The basic reason is that the NSC system is not properly linked to the bureaucratic system.

This lack of connection has two bad aspects. On one hand, high level policy cannot be fully imposed on a bureaucratic machinery which marches to the sound of its own drum. On the other hand, a large part of the bureaucratic process has little meaning because it cannot derive the necessary power from high level policy thrust.

The three pillars of Nixon's foreign policy (strength, partnership, and negotiation) were put into play in the European strategy decisions. The piece associated with the "negotiation" element of foreign policy was fully engaged with the launching of MBFR talks in 1972-1973.

The "strength" piece was relatively easy to fit into the bureaucratic stream. From the Army's point of view this meant (a) maintaining the current level of forces in Europe, (b) adjusting the JSOP, Defense

Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG), and other force documents in the DOD system to crank and the proper number of divisions, and (c) undertaking certain improvements within the Army.

The "partnership" piece presented the difficulties. The Allies had bought a general concept of the types of improvements they should undertake, and did a good job under a special European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) sponsored by a consortium of European Allies (Eurogroup) to make real progress in improving our overall conventional combat capability. However, because (1) we did not come in strong in NATO with the specific details of the program we had written -- and (2) we ourselves did not link that program to what we were doing in our own national force planning process, an adequate sense of seriousness and urgency was not imparted to our Allies. We more or less left them to their own devices except that we came up with general exhortations to do better.

Two years passed. This was an unfortunate loss of time that could have been used to better advantage. During that period we were successful in halting a general trend of force reductions in NATO. But we did not give the Allies the powerful leadership, example, and guidance in the defense area that we were, in fact, prepared to give them and capable of giving them. Leadership and enlightened cooperation in defense in NATO is, in my opinion, the essential prerequisite to the solution of the economic and political issues that we face with the Europeans. In 1971 we should have given the NATO defense problem extraordinary attention and

the full measure of our national effort.

In June 1973 when our Secretary of Defense designate, Dr. Schlesinger, confronted the Allies for the first time at the NATO Ministerial Meetings, he threw himself immediately at this problem. He began by stressing to our Allies that the relative weight of the European contribution to the common defense needed to be increased still further. He was specific and proposed a set of explicit measures as well as a program for putting them in effect -- this was, believe it or not, essentially the program of 1970-1971. He has followed this up with vigorous personal action.

The bureaucracy is still balking, however. Crystal clear initiatives outlined at the highest level of our government are watered down, interpreted, and generally gobbled up by the system. The consequences that could result from such weaknesses in our organization for material security strategy and policy implementation could be very dangerous.

We must tie together in a real way the strength, partnership, and negotiation threads of our policy framework in order to follow through on a set of straightforward policy decisions and energize our Allies. Europeans must have confidence in us and in themselves to overcome the spectre of self-seeking divisiveness which looms today -- threatening their security as well as our own. The hard facts can be masked by a lot of political science jargon and economic hocus-pocus theory. But the simple truth is that Europe needs our leadership now more than ever before.

Dreams on their side of the Atlantic, and on our side, of some security arrangement without true two way consultation with the U.S. followed by U.S. leading dynamically are unrealistic, and very risky.

We can provide the necessary consultative framework and leadership only if all of us work to improve the system -- and try to get rid of that "one adversary too many."

Some Possibilities for Doing it Better

The whole approach to this paper may be wrong. Suggestions for "doing it better" may already be outdated because they are based on the problems of 1969-1974, rather than looking toward the solutions for 1975-1980. On the other hand, you may not be ready to really think about 1980. The logic of this paper tells you that we should seriously consider a single service -- a truly combined Army, Navy, and Air Force supported by a single civil/military general staff. Enough of that, I didn't think you were ready.

Some of the weaknesses identified in the preceding pages might, however, be minimized by measures such as the following:

- With no change to the present NSC system, establish a Strategy and Policy Board (SPB). All members and the secretarial staff of the board would have other full-time "mainstream" jobs. The membership would consist of the Director of the Policy and Planning Staff of State, the Director of Political-Military Affairs of State, the Counsellor of the Department of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Plans and Policy,

a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PAE), the Director of the Joint Staff and, the Operations Deputies (OPDEPS) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The board would be charged with (a) insuring that the logic for consistency of all NSC actions and decisions was unambiguous and understood at least by the board, (b) following through on all NSC strategy and policy decisions to see that they were being carried out, (c) recommending strategy and policy initiatives for study or action in the wider NSC system, (d) rendering reports on (a), (b), and (c) to all agencies and to Mr. Kissinger in his capacity as Advisor to the President on National Security Affairs.

- Redesignate the ASD(ISA) as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Policy Coordination (SPC) with the additional title of Chairman, Defense Strategy and Policy Coordination Board (DSPCB). The membership of this board would consist of the Department of Defense members of the State-Defense SPB (above) and the DSPCB would have similar responsibilities within the Department of Defense.
- With no major change to the present structure of the Joint Staff, reconstruct the JSOP as the Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) made up of three co-equal elements dealing with (a) our forces ("strength"), (b) the forces of our Allies ("partnership") and (c) the impact

of negotiation on the two. Modernize the strategy volume of the JSP to be "real world" and tie it more tightly to the NSC process. Shorten the JSP and leave much of the detail of the forces to the services. Publish an updated JSP every six months.

- Insure that all actions and studies under the NSC system receive the highest priority attention by the Joint and Service Staffs. This should be a priority higher than any other actions. That means that relatively high level officers should be involved in the details from the start in order to tie other ongoing staff work to NSC process.
- Take steps so that the JCS do not take premature fixed positions on most issues. We will be in an increasingly dynamic planning period throughout the 1970's, and we must avoid a situation where military advice becomes outdated even before it becomes agreed upon in the JCS system.
- Issue guidance to all military officers to assume a positive attitude reflecting an understanding that their advice is necessary and is sought -- as it is. Proceeding from a contrary assumption reduces confidence in such advice, and, in fact, lowers the quality of the advice.

- Establish procedures to permit the Joint Staff and Service Staffs to take an active lead in drafting objective and real world papers for use in the interagency arena whether solicited or not. These papers should be timely, short (not like this one), and useful -- designed to fill a perceived need.
- Insure that military officers take care to argue issues. A hard line "action officer" stance based on the philosophy that it doesn't matter what game you play (much less how you play the game) as long as you win, is nonproductive and weakens confidence in military advice. We must know exactly what game is being played and argue the issues on their merits. We should be particularly wary about an approach that measures success in terms of "we got our fix into the paper." Rather, we should check our progress in terms of (a) what is the substantive effect of "our fix?" (b) what is the substantive impact of the paper? and (c) is it worth fixing?
- Take steps so that every citizen and soldier fights to keep control of the bureaucratic machine. Staff officers and leaders must challenge every assignment and every bureaucratic action with a view toward testing whether it fits within a wider policy or not. Continually ask the question is what I am doing or about to do contributing to a goal or mission that I understand? If not, don't do it -- or get a clarification of the mission.

- Review curriculums of service schools and war colleges to insure that they are giving adequate emphasis to tactics, strategy, and military history. These are the military arts. Economics and political science are important too, and military officers must be proficient in those disciplines. However, the nation has others on whom it can call to fulfill its needs in those areas. Professional officers should be the nation's established experts in the military arts.
- Take action to improve institutional memory in the Joint and Service Staffs and to provide continuing Pentagon staff experience through a normal service career. Perhaps selected Captains (USA) could be assigned to strategy/policy staff positions with a view toward repetitive tours in the grade of major/lieutenant colonel, then colonel.

It is particularly difficult to make recommendations with regard to one final area, and a deeper analysis should be undertaken to find some answers. This is the question of interface with our Allies. In the coming era we have to have a much smoother planning, programming, and operational fit with certain key Allies. The reason this is not an easy problem is because there are an awful lot of complex variables involved. We can lick the problem and we must, if we are to prevent expensive mistakes. The solution should include examination of:

- OSD organization for interface with our Allies.
- The role and relationship of our military missions and attaches abroad.
- The connection of the overseas "Country Team" with the Washington defense strategy/policy community.
- The division of work and responsibility within the U.S. Mission to NATO and the role of the Defense Advisor to the Mission.

DESIGN-TO-COST: MANAGEMENT INNOVATION?

A DISERVICE ?

BY

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM C. MILLER

APRIL 1974

The thoughts and opinions expressed herein are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting any official views of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

I. INTRODUCTION

Department of Defense weapon system procurement has been a major topic of discussion over the last several years, but the debate appears to have intensified and focused most recently on ways to hold the costs of individual new weapon systems to an affordable limit. The word "affordable" is key here because it implies both parts of the weapon cost problem -- the absolute cost of the system and the size of the defense procurement budget.

II. BACKGROUND

It is well known to attendees at this conference that for the last decade the DOD budget has been under continuous socio-economic pressure for a variety of reasons. Efforts to hold down overall government spending, increased demand for non-defense spending, lingering bitterness over an unpopular war, the desire to apply a "peace dividend" to societal problems at home, inflation, energy distribution problems, personnel costs, and the fact that the very visible DOD budget is the largest "controllable" segment of the federal budget have worked together to cause this year's defense appropriation to buy less than at any other time since before the Korean War. And Congress seems disinclined to alter this downward trend in the foreseeable future.

Against this background, weapon costs have been soaring. The underlying causes are complex, but most frequently blamed are the contracting and procurement regulations under which many of the high visibility, high cost systems were developed. There are other important, more ingrained psychological reasons for these soaring costs, however. One of these might be labeled the "nothing-but-the-best-for-our-boys-in-the-field" syndrome.

Defense research and development is dedicated to placing appropriate weapon systems and equipment in the hands of operational personnel. This has been interpreted over the years to mean steadily and unfailingly advancing the state of technology and ensuring that only the most modern, the most capable, and therefore by default the most complex and expensive weapon systems are developed. In the process it was implicitly assumed that funds would be available to procure the requisite number of systems so developed, but it soon became evident that this assumption ignored the basic economic realities. For example, a recent DOD survey of ongoing weapon system development programs showed that in almost every area investigated, the estimated cost of procuring the new system would substantially exceed the dollars to buy it in the quantities required.¹

General George S. Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, put it this way,

"We are going to be out of business if we don't find ways to cut costs. We simply can't go on spending the kind of money we are spending now. The rising costs of weapon systems - some 300 percent over the past decade - coupled with a marked loss in buying power, leaves us only three alternatives:

- We acquire fewer weapon systems.
- We cut the size of the force.
- We find ways to drastically reduce the cost of acquiring and operating weapon systems."²

Soaring weapon costs have not been just an Air Force problem though; they have been a DOD problem. General Henry A. Miley, Jr., Commanding General of the Army Material Command, addressed the problem thusly:

". . . one theme appears to dominate the thinking of Army management: cost control and cost reduction. Although the world outside the Army may not yet appreciate or believe it, the Army has become more cost-conscious than perhaps ever before in its history."³

Congress has certainly not ignored this issue either, often imposing across the board cuts on Defense research and development funding, cuts much deeper than could be justified by identification of specific program ills alone.⁴ As a result of all these factors, one of DOD's primary aims has been to establish policies and regulations that would eliminate both the procedural and the psychological causes behind soaring weapon costs.

III. IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION

Weapon development and procurement policy revisions have been phased in over time -- improved techniques and checks on cost estimating, less concurrency of development and production to reduce risk, increased use of prototypes to prove out new ideas and provide more firm cost data, establishment of milestones in developmental contracts with test and evaluation goals at each phase, improvements to weapon system program management by more clearly defining accountability and authority and giving program managers direct access to the highest levels of individual Service management, and the so-called "high-low mix" approach to weapon system acquisition. This last approach differs from the former in that rather than honing managerial procedures, it seeks to alter the "nothing-but-the-best" syndrome.

The high-low mix concept is founded on the observation that while there are some missions for which numbers of units are vital for success and other missions for which only the highest performance systems can adequately meet an enemy's thrust, today's fiscal climate will not permit acquisition of the high performance systems in large numbers. The defense manager espousing the high-low mix approach therefore compromises by procuring for a particular mission small numbers of high performance, sophisticated weapon systems capable of coping with

the maximum enemy threat, and at the same time procures a larger number of less sophisticated and less expensive but still capable weapons for countering the lower capability enemy threats.

There are many examples of the high-low mix approach being applied to defense procurement; one particularly applicable instance is the Navy's ship construction program, specifically the surface escort category. At one end of the spectrum of capabilities (and cost) in surface escorts are the nuclear powered frigates, DLGNs, the latest of which it is estimated will cost \$268 million before construction is complete.⁵ The Navy now has in commission or in various stages of construction eight nuclear powered surface escorts. Clearly at these prices the country could not afford many surface combatants, yet the block obsolescence of those escorts constructed during World War II demands their retirement. To maintain the numbers of ships needed, the bulk of new escorts are and will continue to come from the "low" side of the high-low mix -- destroyer escorts and patrol frigates that are not quite as capable as DLGNs but cost about one-fourth as much.

The most recent management innovation, however, is the "design-to-cost" concept. While a precise definition of this concept is still evolving, design-to-cost is generally construed to mean that the average unit production cost of a major system is viewed as a design parameter in the same way that

schedule and performance have been in the past. It is not clear who authored this concept within the Department of Defense, if indeed there was a single author. However, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, must be recognized as an early advocate of design-to-cost. Speaking in 1970, Dr. Foster emphasized the vital nature of cost consciousness.

"We shall insist relentlessly -- as a point without peer in our management -- that price has as much priority as performance. This does not rule out vigorous pursuit of new technology where that technology is required or can pay its way. And frequently, new technology can be used to reduce costs. Yet we must design-to-a-price, a much lower price, or else we will not be able to afford what we need. Defense budgets are going down. The costs of what we need, just our essential needs, are going up. Our only solution is to make cost a principal design parameter. That is how we must now define what is 'best'. We have no other choice."⁶

The first formalization of design-to-cost within the Defense Department was embodied in DOD Directive 5000.1 issued in July 1971. This directive prescribed the following regarding cost management:

- That system cost shall be broadly defined to include the cost of ownership and use, not merely original acquisition cost.
- That before a system enters development, cost is to be established as a design objective which then becomes one of the principal focuses of the requirement definition process.

- That modification of performance requirements and scheduling will be considered in order to adhere to the design cost objective.

The foundation laid by DOD Directive 5000.1 was reinforced later by Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements in a memorandum to the Service Secretaries dated 18 June 1973. In it, he initiated the process of establishing design-to-cost goals on all major Defense programs that had not yet received approval for production. This time the directive was specific, both in the scope of the guidance and regarding who could decide on the appropriateness of cost goals -- "It is the intent that in the future all new major programs will have established Design to a Cost goals. Those new programs in which Design to a Cost goals are assessed to be inappropriate or not feasible will be forwarded for DSARC⁷ review and approval."

So Defense has adopted the design-to-cost concept in earnest. But what does design-to-cost actually mean? Is it really new? Is it universally applicable? Can it actually be imposed on the defense industry?

IV. DESIGN-TO-COST

James McCullough of the Institute for Defense Analyses noted⁸ that there are at least three interpretations one could make regarding design-to-cost:

- A "buzz word" meant to attract attention to the cost problem.

- A concept whereby the DSARC establishes a cost target or cost "bogey" reflecting the latest estimate of unit production cost at that point in the development cycle.

- The concept implied by DOD Directive 5000.1 whereby cost is an important factor during trade-off studies of a system during its design phase.

In the latter interpretation, considered to be most applicable by this author, design-to-cost is related to the methodology called Value Engineering that was employed widely in DOD during the mid-60s to analyze a product and determine if its costs could be reduced without impairing its performance or reliability.⁹ However, under design-to-cost the Services and their project managers have the authority to make performance and schedule adjustments as necessary to achieve cost goals.

Management of defense research and development has always forced consideration of various factors: the threat to be met, current and projected tactics, the sense of urgency, estimates of enemy reaction, international implications, the basic system concept, its technical feasibility, technical trade-offs, cost effectiveness trade-offs, political considerations, etc. In making decisions the defense manager must take into account a subtle blend of the known, the predicted, and the unknown, assessing in timely fashion each element of the mix. What is

new about the design-to-cost concept is that in the past, cost estimates for a new weapon system were made after its "required" performance had been determined. Seldom were cost and performance correlated during development. Under design-to-cost, system cost has been established as a design parameter of equal priority with schedule and performance.

As the reader may have surmised, design-to-cost is not a new concept; only its application to defense development programs can be classified as innovative. Examples of applying design-to-cost abound in industry and private life. When Ford Motor Company introduced their Pinto model line, that was design-to-cost in action. Certainly a higher performance, more luxurious automobile could have been designed, but average unit production cost was obviously a critical design factor. The electronic digital computer industry provides equally valid examples.

In private life, consider the man who is about to build a new house for himself. His dream house may cost \$150 thousand to build while his budget may support construction of a house worth \$50 thousand. Cost is vitally important to this man as he trades off spaciousness and convenience items he may consider "essential" in order to get the final product within his affordable range.

Applying design-to-cost to specific defense procurement programs cannot be described in such simplistic terms and,

in fact, may not even be possible under certain circumstances. It has been argued¹⁰ with some validity that design-to-cost is really appropriate only when the defense program meets certain narrow criteria for applicability. The argument states that the development program must

- Still be in its early conceptual design phase so that meaningful trade-offs among cost, performance and schedule can be made.

- Involve low technological risk so that cost estimates engender confidence. Past cost overruns have usually been associated with high technology, high risk programs.

- Potentially involve a long production run so that advantages of learning curve, hard tooling, etc. may be utilized.

- Involve competition as far into production as possible rather than employing sole source procurement, another cost reduction technique.

- Of course, be cost-effective relative to other procurement methods, otherwise why bother? For example, if development of a new system is less cost-effective than upgrading an old system, then designing a new system (to-cost or any other way) does not make sense.

While a purist may adopt these as valid rules for applicability, it is postulated that such strict rules eliminate the flexibility that effective managers require to be innovative.

For example, it is admitted that cost estimates on high risk programs tend to be risky themselves. But (1) parametric cost estimating and close cost controls can reduce those risks, and (2) the fact that estimates may be in error should not deter the prudent manager from making them. No, design-to-cost is too useful a concept, too versatile in its application, and too amenable to iterative solutions to restrict it within the narrow confines of such a set of rules. It is estimated that only in isolated instances, such as designing a system like Manned Orbiting Laboratory where extreme reliability is required for human safety, would design-to-cost techniques prove inapplicable. Even then some sub-systems may be so designed.

As for the defense industry, how does it view this new way of doing business? One reading was made available approximately a year ago when the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Reducing Costs of Defense Systems Acquisition published a report¹¹ on the subject. This task force was made up of a wide range of senior management and engineering personnel who had been personally associated with defense procurement for many years. The task force was unanimous in its support for the design-to-cost concept and produced a series of definitive recommendations on how best to implement it within DOD. While the group had some reservations (to be discussed later in Section VI), these reservations were focused on how DOD must change itself to effectively design-to-cost rather

than on how industry would respond.

For completeness, the next section will outline the sequence of steps that might take place in designing a hypothetical weapon system by applying design-to-cost techniques.

V. HYPOTHETICAL DESIGN SEQUENCE

This section will consider in two parts a hypothetical sequence of steps approximating the design-to-cost of a new weapon system; the first part will consider the sequence from DOD's viewpoint, the second will illustrate how industry must adapt.

Within DOD the steps are these.

- As in any system design, define the military requirement. No amplification of this step is considered necessary.
- Decide whether the requirement can be met by design-to-cost techniques, recalling from the previous section that the approach selected must be the most cost-effective and that there may be some overriding factor militating against selecting design-to-cost.
- Establish the cost threshold and performance specifications. Both of these are key ingredients to the success of following steps. The cost decision requires trade-off analyses which consider funds available to buy new weapons, the capability of existing systems to meet the stated requirement, the feasibility of upgrading existing systems, the

magnitude of research and development funding that reasonably can be expected to be available, etc. The performance characteristics should be sufficiently flexible to allow meaningful trade-offs to be made; typically they might be expressed as a range of allowable performance. For example, when specifying performance for a new tank, the XM1, in the development contracts the Army constrained only the weight (58 tons), width (144 inches), and not less than a stated minimum acceptable reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability.¹²

- Issue a Request for Proposals for developmental contracts; include the cost threshold and functional performance specifications.

- Evaluate proposals received.

- Award contracts for competitive prototypes. These contracts should include incentives for the contractor to produce a design that will be relatively less expensive to produce if selected.

- Evaluate prototypes and select one for production with or without modifications.

- Award competitive production contracts. The original contract was for development of a prototype only and included no commitment to production or option to produce.

Note that competition is maintained throughout the sequence as a lever to force costs down. The DSB cost reduction task force felt very strongly on this issue, stating that

"The ultimate price of a weapon system is a complex of many variables -- not the least of which are the contract incentives and competition. The use of competition can in many instances be a more effective incentive than profit alone. Competition faces the contractor with potential loss of business and, therefore, organizational stability or continuity. This is often a stronger motivation than maximization of profit."¹³

From industry's viewpoint there is also a great deal to be done.¹⁴ Proper coordination between design and producing departments at an early stage is mandatory in providing the cross-fertilization necessary to meet the design-to-cost objective. Accordingly, a talent-laden team must be set up right at the beginning made up of people from design, tooling, purchasing, accounting, and manufacturing. If a part or assembly is to be procured outside the home plant, careful consideration should be given to possible procurement sources and alternative sources and to the availability of the material and processes required to produce that part. If the part is to be made in-house, it should be designed so that it is compatible with available in-house equipment and facilities.

Careful selection of design specifications can also make a big difference in ultimate cost. Wherever possible, standard hardware, thread sizes, fasteners, and electrical connectors should be called out. Ease of assembly of the final design would, of course, tend to hold labor costs down, while prescribing less restrictive tolerances on non-critical parts

will help to avoid unnecessary rejections.

Implementation of design-to-cost in the Department of Defense is a big job, a challenging job from both DOD's standpoint and from industry's. It sounds promising, but there are potential pitfalls that lie in the path.

VI. POTENTIAL PITFALLS

The most prevalent, sometimes unspoken objection to the design-to-cost concept is a visceral one -- it may be that tight cost ceilings, relaxed specifications and trade-off freedom at the contractor level will combine to produce weapon systems not worth buying relative to currently available hardware. The prevalence of this reaction may stem in part from the fact that no adequate answer to this objection has been heard. It appears that constant scrutiny at each stage of system development and effective DOD-contractor communication provide the only barricades around this pitfall.

Mr. J. Fred Bucy, Executive Vice President of Texas Instrument Corporation and Chairman of the DSB Task Force on Reducing Costs of Defense Systems Acquisition, voices another objection.

"Continual reference to this effort as 'design-to-cost' gives us real concern. The danger is that lip service to this new 'buzz phrase' will be used in place of any real substance in accomplishment of 'design-to-cost'."¹⁵

He then goes on to summarize the Task Force's one overriding reservation with the entire concept, ". . . that without major changes in the defense acquisition culture that now exists, the outlook for effective 'design-to-cost' will not be at all promising."¹⁶ The cultural changes the Task Force considers essential are these.

- "The present process of contract negotiation and award for production phases should be changed from one that focuses on cost justification to one which is based on price . . ."

- "DOD personnel . . . at all levels must be motivated and held accountable through a more effective system of awards and penalties."

- "DOD's hierarchy of defense acquisition management must be simplified, and the project managers given full authority . . ."

- "Hardware competition must be maintained throughout the life of many major products . . ."

- "More emphasis must be given to prior performance and responsiveness to DOD's hardware needs, in the selection of contractors."¹⁷

Their first point is probably the most perceptive of all. How can a system that begins by establishing a cost base in negotiations, and then allows a profit as a certain percentage of that cost, hope to motivate contractors toward cost

reductions? Such a system is patently self-defeating!

Their third point cannot be let to pass, though, without a hearty "hurrah". Given DOD's track record on organizational reductions, however, one is tempted to despair and to side with Admiral Hyman Rickover who reportedly once remarked that the only feasible method of getting the DOD hierarchy down to size would be to come in on a Sunday night and brick over every door on the fifth floor of the Pentagon. Then, the next Sunday night,

There are several other basic questions outstanding regarding implementation of design-to-cost:¹⁸

- In DOD, how can sufficient latitude be injected into current procurement regulations to permit relaxation of specifications as necessary to ensure attainment of performance and cost objectives?

- How can industry be motivated to propose realistic rather than optimistic technical objectives when proposing to a specified cost goal?

- How can design-to-cost best be passed down through the layers of subcontractors?

- How can both DOD and industry personnel be effectively motivated to take full advantage of the concept?

Motivation may be the real key to making design-to-cost work.

This is where the most difficult challenge may lie. LTG Robert E. Coffin, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering

(Acquisition Management), put it succinctly, "Without question, it is more fun to design way out, pushing the state-of-the-art, sophisticated, gold-plated and therefore ultra expensive systems. But there just aren't going to be any new programs where cost is no object."¹⁹ How does one get that fact across?

VII. CONCLUSION

These and other difficult pitfalls lie ahead, possibly the deepest and broadest are yet to be found, yet design-to-cost is definitely here to stay. As Dr. Foster said four years ago regarding soaring costs and shrinking budgets, "Our only solution is to make cost a principal design parameter. That is how we must define what is 'best'. We have no other choice."²⁰

VIII. EPILOGUE

I cannot end this paper without addressing its title and the question it poses; afterall, "Innovation in the Military" is the theme of our conference. Is design-to-cost a management innovation? For the answer I'd like to paraphrase Thomas A. Edison who was commenting on the essence of genius - -

Innovation is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.

With this as a definition I would submit that design-to-cost in the Department of Defense qualifies as innovation and the most difficult ninety-nine percent is ahead of us.

FOOTNOTES

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15 February 1974

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR COLLEGES

Col. John B. Keeley, USA

The institutions of highest education in the military, the War Colleges, recently have come under increasing scrutiny from within and without the military services. Congress and a small element of the university world have questioned the utility and costs of the War Colleges. Several of the War Colleges are now undergoing an evaluation of their curricula to insure that focus and content are appropriate to the challenges facing the military today. The Army and Navy War Colleges have within the past two years made major changes in their curricula to this end. This scrutiny and these changes are desirable and necessary. Change is inherent in the educational process. It is especially important in the military professional schools as the United States leaves Viet Nam and the "cold war" and moves into a new world.

To avoid change for change's sake, it is necessary for the War Colleges to have a clear understanding of their functions. This essay offers some reflections on this matter. To provide a framework for discussion, three questions will be broadly considered. Why educate the military? Who should be educated? What should be taught?

Why Educate the Military?

The answer to this question is in many parts. Some answers come quickly to mind; the complexity of managing an extensive, expensive, technology-based organization requires periodic updating on what is new in the "business." The reflection associated with a period of education

allows the redefinition of professional goals and the development of new initiatives for the solution of old problems. These are two of the principal reasons justifying advanced education for business executives. They also support education of military executives.

But the most important reasons for educating senior officers stem from two salient characteristics of the military profession. First, the profession spends most of its time not doing what it is ultimately organized and intended to do which is to fight and win wars.* The point here is that the educational needs of an organization which spends most of its time not doing what it was organized and intended to do must be quite unique. The implications of this "uniqueness" must be identified and examined by the War Colleges. Second, the profession has a strong and most important ethical content. The ethical issues involve ultimately the life and death of the nation and its citizens. For this reason the ethical issues of the military profession are profoundly different from those of other professions. There is a tendency for the values, the ethics, of the military profession to be taken for granted. This must not happen. The military must continually refresh and invigorate its values. These values must be tested and reconfirmed in a society which has changing and often antagonistic values. The War Colleges have a vital task here.

Before the unique aspects of the military profession and its values are studied, it is necessary to establish a conception of the role of

*In the 29 years since 1945, Korea and Viet Nam have involved approximately 11 years of active fighting. Approximately 72% of the US military's time since 1945 has not been in combat.

force and policy in the achievement of national ends. It is necessary to examine the purposes for which force is employed both in peace and war. The implications of Clausewitz's dictum "from which war is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means" are far more complex than either military or civilian leaders appreciate. The military are the handmaidens of policy in peace as well as war. How the military defines its relation to the policy process is vital to the profession and to society. It is under this rubric that the functions, the unique characteristics and the values of the profession can be studied as an integrated whole. Through this approach the War Colleges establish their legitimacy as the apex of military education.

The War Colleges cannot teach everything. They should teach the profession. To the extent that the military need specialists in management, international relations, psychology and the like, they should be trained at civilian educational institutions. War Colleges should educate their students in the most demanding and complex of all professions--the military profession in a democratic society.

The phenomena of war and the military profession as objects of research and special concern are sadly neglected children in today's time. The American intellectual community has at best a thinly veiled distaste for the subject. Sadly, the American military, which has a long history of winning wars with organizations, weapons and strategies derived from other countries, also has the pragmatist's dislike of philosophical speculation.* Further, it is also almost inevitable that, during periods

*How many officers, colonel and above, have read, let alone studied,
On War?

of peace, successful "management" becomes the sine qua non for professional advancement. Management becomes a surrogate for war fighting.

In order that the American military can best respond to its future responsibilities it must fully understand its role and functions in peace and war. The War Colleges can perform this function. American society should insist that they do so.

What has been emphasized here is not intended to exclude the conventional academic disciplines from the War College curriculum or to establish a "cult" of the military. Disciplines such as history, economics, public and business administration, sociology and international relations have real value when taught in the context of what has been described above. In fact, their value to the profession is directly dependent upon the context in which they are taught.

Who Should Be Educated?

Remembering that we are dealing at the highest level of military education, selection for this education should probably be restricted to the top 10% of the officers of the grades of colonel/captain and lieutenant colonel/commander. It is probable that future policymakers and future advisors to policymakers will come from this group. This would be a fairly large number, for to restrict it to a smaller, more carefully selected group would likely leave a significant number of officers destined for higher places as "uneducated." Further, the selection of only a small number has the real danger of generating a self-perpetuating group of military elitists within the services. The military cannot afford intellectual elitism because in time elitism

becomes conservatism and resistance to change. In this selection it is important that there be a representative cross-section of all major functional elements within the services and also from the senior civilian employees within the Department of Defense. The first value of having a disparate group educated together is the effect of having men of mixed experiences, prejudices and perceptions all addressing the same issues. The enrichment is remarkable. A second value is that, if indeed the top 10% have been selected, these people will meet each other with increasing frequency as they move towards positions of greater responsibility. The respect, understanding and friendships established at a War College do much to facilitate the operation of the massive military bureaucracies.

What Should Be Taught?

The curriculum of a War College as a professional institution should focus on the nature of the military profession and the three broad functional responsibilities of the profession. Once these responsibilities have been established the supportive disciplines will be taught to illuminate the complexities that the profession faces today. Let me define these and then briefly outline a curriculum that would support these responsibilities.

As suggested before, every War College has the obligation to define the nature of the military profession to its students. This is so because the large majority of the officers attending a War College can be characterized as having little understanding of the nature and history of the military profession. They are, indeed, skilled aviators, intelligence

specialists, infantrymen, submariners and so forth. A useful analogy is to consider them as master craftsmen who know relatively little of the architectural principles which govern the work that they do. To meet their increasing responsibilities, it is necessary to lift their horizons to the level of the architects of military policy.

The historical processes which transformed the warrior class into a profession need to be explored. The internal values of loyalty, integrity, discipline and obedience need to be discussed. The clash between these values and those of a liberal society must be examined. The compatibility of military organizational principles and modern management techniques should be considered. These issues should be raised not with intent of resolving them but for the purpose of identifying them as current and continuing problems for the military profession and for society at large.

It is in this portion of the study that the three inherent functions of any military organization should be identified. To refresh those who may have forgotten:

The first responsibility of the military profession is to organize, train, equip, maintain and employ forces as directed. In peacetime this is largely a management function. The object of this function is to maintain the highest level of combat readiness possible with the resources available. It occupies most of the time and resources of most of the Armed Forces. It is the area of professional responsibility that most officers understand best and to which they devote most of their concern. The study of resource allocation, economics and organizational psychology would be keyed to this responsibility.

The second responsibility is to provide military advice to national political leaders. This proposition, as stated, is probably agreeable to most thoughtful military and civilians. The interpretation of what is "proper or appropriate" military advice is a subtle and complex problem. This issue can be stated in the form of two questions: What are the limits of military power in the support of policy? What are the obligations of policy to military power once military power is engaged in combat? There are no simple answers to these questions. Yet these questions must be addressed and addressed again if the military is to understand its proper role in our society. The complex, almost undefinable process which selects and elects national political leaders generally prepares them well for dealing with domestic issues. It seldom provides any real preparation for the awesomely difficult task of directing the armed forces of the United States. As is evident by the institutional changes of the Department of Defense and the Executive Staff of the White House which have occurred over the past 20 years, there is a recognized need for increased civilian control of the processes of formulating and implementing national security policy. There are several implications to the increased civilianization of the national security organizations. The implication of most importance here is the inevitable role confusion which has occurred at the highest levels of policy formulation.

This role confusion is reflected not only in the fact of senior civilians within the Defense Department planning air strikes and determining weapons systems characteristics but also in the military's own concept of the soldier-statesman. This hermaphrodite role raises serious questions

about the civilian control of the military. The controversy over General Haig's position in the White House is only the latest example.

What issues are properly the primary concern of the military? What is the proper role of the professional military in policy formulation? As has been suggested above, it is not likely that a President or his civilian staff assistants will have the background to be especially well qualified to deal with these questions except in broad generalities. For this reason, it is doubly important for the military to have a firm conception of its role in the policy process. This role is always subject to interpretation and modification by the President, but at least a clear understanding of the nature of its role by the military provides a point of departure for establishing effective civilian control. Some in our society would resist the idea that the military profession has the right and obligation to define its role; yet, if the military fails to do so, it is possible that the question will either go begging or, more likely, be resolved through the increased civilianization of the armed forces.* Both will result in the erosion of the military as a profession and weaken the character of the armed forces with serious consequences in time of conflict. I have deliberately belabored this point because it is the responsibility most difficult to carry out and most subject to catastrophic consequences when not properly executed. The study of historical case studies will best address this area of concern.

* For a discussion of some of the implications of civilianization of the Armed Forces see Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."

The third responsibility is to define the future. Simply stated. Most difficult to do. That this is difficult may account to some degree why the military have been so partial, traditionally, to preparing for the last war. The lead time for change in the military is very long. Longer today than it has ever been. It takes years to develop and produce not only hardware but also to make significant changes to organization and training. Near term conflicts will always be fought with resources and doctrine in being. The process of renewal of the military organization, if it is to be fruitful, requires that the military assess the nature of likely conflicts and likely peacetime roles in the years to come. This problem is particularly acute today. The United States detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic seriously weakens the "cold war" rationale for large military forces. The fraying NATO scenario also weakens the rationale for the kinds of military force that the United States presently has. Increasing costs are likely to price conventional force structures out of existence. This portion of the course would serve as the capstone of the year. It would integrate the previous studies.

A curriculum so designed does not prevent a War College from teaching subjects peculiar to the interests of its own service. To the contrary, the special functions and responsibilities of each service can be best highlighted in such a course.

To sum up: the approach discussed in this paper provides a coherent, intellectual framework for organizing a War College curriculum. Concomitantly, it provides a totally defensible raison d'etre for the War Colleges.

Most important, however, is that it provides a context for the student which makes his studies professionally meaningful. For years the War Colleges have been providing the student with pieces of the professional puzzle; now is the time to reveal the cover to the puzzle box.

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The answer to this question is in many parts. Some answers come quickly to mind; the complexity of managing an extensive, expensive, technology-based organization requires periodic updating on what is new in the "business." The reflection associated with a period of education

allows the redefinition of professional goals and the development of new initiatives for the solution of old problems. These are two of the principal reasons justifying advanced education for business executives. They also support education of military executives.

But the most important reasons for educating senior officers stem from two salient characteristics of the military profession. First, the profession spends most of its time not doing what it is ultimately organized and intended to do which is to fight and win wars.* The point here is that the educational needs of an organization which spends most of its time not doing what it was organized and intended to do must be quite unique. The implications of this "uniqueness" must be identified and examined by the War Colleges. Second, the profession has a strong and most important ethical content. The ethical issues involve ultimately the life and death of the nation and its citizens. For this reason the ethical issues of the military profession are profoundly different from those of other professions. There is a tendency for the values, the ethics, of the military profession to be taken for granted. This must not happen. The military must continually refresh and invigorate its values. These values must be tested and reconfirmed in a society which has changing and often antagonistic values. The War Colleges have a vital task here.

Before the unique aspects of the military profession and its values are studied, it is necessary to establish a conception of the role of

*In the 29 years since 1945, Korea and Viet Nam have involved approximately 11 years of active fighting. Approximately 72% of the US military's time since 1945 has not been in combat.

force and policy in the achievement of national ends. It is necessary to examine the purposes for which force is employed both in peace and war. The implications of Clausewitz's dictum "from which war is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means" are far more complex than either military or civilian leaders appreciate. The military are the handmaidens of policy in peace as well as war. How the military defines its relation to the policy process is vital to the profession and to society. It is under this rubric that the functions, the unique characteristics and the values of the profession can be studied as an integrated whole. Through this approach the War Colleges establish their legitimacy as the apex of military education.

The War Colleges cannot teach everything. They should teach the profession. To the extent that the military need specialists in management, international relations, psychology and the like, they should be trained at civilian educational institutions. War Colleges should educate their students in the most demanding and complex of all professions--the military profession in a democratic society.

The phenomena of war and the military profession as objects of research and special concern are sadly neglected children in today's time. The American intellectual community has at best a thinly veiled distaste for the subject. Sadly, the American military, which has a long history of winning wars with organizations, weapons and strategies derived from other countries, also has the pragmatist's dislike of philosophical speculation.* Further, it is also almost inevitable that, during periods

*How many officers, colonel and above, have read, let alone studied, On War?

of peace, successful "management" becomes the sine qua non for professional advancement. Management becomes a surrogate for war fighting.

In order that the American military can best respond to its future responsibilities it must fully understand its role and functions in peace and war. The War Colleges can perform this function. American society should insist that they do so.

What has been emphasized here is not intended to exclude the conventional academic disciplines from the War College curriculum or to establish a "cult" of the military. Disciplines such as history, economics, public and business administration, sociology and international relations have real value when taught in the context of what has been described above. In fact, their value to the profession is directly dependent upon the context in which they are taught.

Who Should Be Educated?

Remembering that we are dealing at the highest level of military education, selection for this education should probably be restricted to the top 10% of the officers of the grades of colonel/captain and lieutenant colonel/commander. It is probable that future policymakers and future advisor to policymakers will come from this group. This would be a fairly large number, for to restrict it to a smaller, more carefully selected group would likely leave a significant number of officers destined for higher places as "uneducated." Further, the selection of only a small number has the real danger of generating a self-perpetuating group of military elitists within the services. The military cannot afford intellectual elitism because in time elitism

becomes conservatism and resistance to change. In this selection it is important that there be a representative cross-section of all major functional elements within the services and also from the senior civilian employees within the Department of Defense. The first value of having a disparate group educated together is the effect of having men of mixed experiences, prejudices and perceptions all addressing the same issues. The enrichment is remarkable. A second value is that, if indeed the top 10% have been selected, these people will meet each other with increasing frequency as they move towards positions of greater responsibility. The respect, understanding and friendships established at a War College do much to facilitate the operation of the massive military bureaucracies.

What Should Be Taught?

The curriculum of a War College as a professional institution should focus on the nature of the military profession and the three broad functional responsibilities of the profession. Once these responsibilities have been established the supportive disciplines will be taught to illuminate the complexities that the profession faces today. Let me define these and then briefly outline a curriculum that would support these responsibilities.

As suggested before, every War College has the obligation to define the nature of the military profession to its students. This is so because the large majority of the officers attending a War College can be characterized as having little understanding of the nature and history of the military profession. They are, indeed, skilled aviators, intelligence

specialists, infantrymen, submariners and so forth. A useful analogy is to consider them as master craftsmen who know relatively little of the architectural principles which govern the work that they do. To meet their increasing responsibilities, it is necessary to lift their horizons to the level of the architects of military policy.

The historical processes which transformed the warrior class into a profession need to be explored. The internal values of loyalty, integrity, discipline and obedience need to be discussed. The clash between these values and those of a liberal society must be examined. The compatibility of military organizational principles and modern management techniques should be considered. These issues should be raised not with intent of resolving them but for the purpose of identifying them as current and continuing problems for the military profession and for society at large.

It is in this portion of the study that the three inherent functions of any military organization should be identified. To refresh those who may have forgotten:

The first responsibility of the military profession is to organize, train, equip, maintain and employ forces as directed. In peacetime this is largely a management function. The object of this function is to maintain the highest level of combat readiness possible with the resources available. It occupies most of the time and resources of most of the Armed Forces. It is the area of professional responsibility that most officers understand best and to which they devote most of their concern. The study of resource allocation, economics and organizational psychology would be keyed to this responsibility.

The second responsibility is to provide military advice to national political leaders. This proposition, as stated, is probably agreeable to most thoughtful military and civilians. The interpretation of what is "proper or appropriate" military advice is a subtle and complex problem. This issue can be stated in the form of two questions: What are the limits of military power in the support of policy? What are the obligations of policy to military power once military power is engaged in combat? There are no simple answers to these questions. Yet these questions must be addressed and addressed again if the military is to understand its proper role in our society. The complex, almost undefinable process which selects and elects national political leaders generally prepares them well for dealing with domestic issues. It seldom provides any real preparation for the awesomely difficult task of directing the armed forces of the United States. As is evident by the institutional changes of the Department of Defense and the Executive Staff of the White House which have occurred over the past 20 years, there is a recognized need for increased civilian control of the processes of formulating and implementing national security policy. There are several implications to the increased civilianization of the national security organizations. The implication of most importance here is the inevitable role confusion which has occurred at the highest levels of policy formulation.

This role confusion is reflected not only in the fact of senior civilians within the Defense Department planning air strikes and determining weapons systems characteristics but also in the military's own concept of the soldier-statesman. This hermaphrodite role raises serious questions

about the civilian control of the military. The controversy over General Haig's position in the White House is only the latest example.

What issues are properly the primary concern of the military? What is the proper role of the professional military in policy formulation? As has been suggested above, it is not likely that a President or his civilian staff assistants will have the background to be especially well qualified to deal with these questions except in broad generalities. For this reason, it is doubly important for the military to have a firm conception of its role in the policy process. This role is always subject to interpretation and modification by the President, but at least a clear understanding of the nature of its role by the military provides a point of departure for establishing effective civilian control. Some in our society would resist the idea that the military profession has the right and obligation to define its role; yet, if the military fails to do so, it is possible that the question will either go begging or, more likely, be resolved through the increased civilianization of the armed forces.* Both will result in the erosion of the military as a profession and weaken the character of the armed forces with serious consequences in time of conflict. I have deliberately belabored this point because it is the responsibility most difficult to carry out and most subject to catastrophic consequences when not properly executed. The study of historical case studies will best address this area of concern.

* For a discussion of some of the implications of civilianization of the Armed Forces see Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."

The third responsibility is to define the future. Simply stated. Most difficult to do. That this is difficult may account to some degree why the military have been so partial, traditionally, to preparing for the last war. The lead time for change in the military is very long. Longer today than it has ever been. It takes years to develop and produce not only hardware but also to make significant changes to organization and training. Near term conflicts will always be fought with resources and doctrine in being. The process of renewal of the military organization, if it is to be fruitful, requires that the military assess the nature of likely conflicts and likely peacetime roles in the years to come. This problem is particularly acute today. The United States detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic seriously weakens the "cold war" rationale for large military forces. The fraying NATO scenario also weakens the rationale for the kinds of military force that the United States presently has. Increasing costs are likely to price conventional force structures out of existence. This portion of the course would serve as the capstone of the year. It would integrate the previous studies.

A curriculum so designed does not prevent a War College from teaching subjects peculiar to the interests of its own service. To the contrary, the special functions and responsibilities of each service can be best highlighted in such a course.

To sum up: the approach discussed in this paper provides a coherent, intellectual framework for organizing a War College curriculum. Concomitantly, it provides a totally defensible raison d'etre for the War Colleges.

Most important, however, is that it provides a context for the student which makes his studies professionally meaningful. For years the War Colleges have been providing the student with pieces of the professional puzzle; now is the time to reveal the cover to the puzzle box.

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RESEARCH PAPER



DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION
"IDENTIFYING MILITARY MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RESISTANCE"

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This paper is a student research paper prepared at the Naval War College. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Navy or the President, Naval War College.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses a new approach to race-relations education for military middle management. Previous efforts have relied on an approach which too often resulted in emotional confrontations and anxiety arousing situations. Such techniques often threatened participants, causing them to reject new information.

The new approach concentrates on giving an intellectual understanding and a rational background of the nature of prejudice before exposing the manager to the emotions which accompany it. This approach will allow an appreciation of prejudice and racism to be developed in the relative safety of a classroom or seminar. It encourages the participant to examine his values, attitudes, and behaviors in a non-threatening environment. It explores the concept of prejudice not as a simple problem of irrational hatred but as a problem of individual and societal rigidities.

The new approach will encourage affirmative action by concentrating on not only an individual's awareness but also on relevant problem solving skills. The Navy in previous programs has done an adequate job of increasing awareness of individual and institutional racism. It has confronted the Navy man with the reality of race problems. The time has come to move forward from awareness to the consideration

of cognitive theories that may prove useful in providing increased understanding and tools for problem solution. Once the middle manager has an understanding of the problem and has been equipped with relevant skills he may be ready and more willing to deal with it.

Background

The following is background material which may be helpful to the reader for understanding the imperative nature of the pursuit of an effective and acceptable race relations program. On the sixth of August 1973, the Navy Human Goals Plan became a formal Naval Instruction with the force of law. The Human Goals plan is viewed as an extension of the Personal Affairs Action Programs begun in 1970. In a personalized sense it can be viewed as an institutionalization of Admiral Zumwalt's manifest concern for humanism in the Navy. It is also a response to the Department of Defense Human Goals Credo which begins with an encompassing statement:

Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, which exists to keep the Nation secure and at peace, must always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman and the civilian employee, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.

The Human Goals Credo goes on to say more specifically that we strive:

. . . to make military and civilian service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, sex, creed or national origin, and to hold those who do business with the Department to full compliance with the policy of equal employment opportunity.¹

The Navy Human Goals Plan responds to this challenge by making a commitment:

To reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and in giving strength to the chain of command.²

It is furthermore important to note that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1973 strengthens the original act of 1964 and requires that minority groups be proportionally represented in all employment categories. Complete commitment is required to the spirit of these laws if their intent is to be fulfilled within a reasonable period of time. Prior programs have substantially increased awareness of the problem. The Human Goals Program must move from this base and provide a process which encourages commitment to the implementation of equal opportunity.

Purpose

The primary purpose of this paper is to present the rationale and design for an alternative approach to race relations education for the naval (military) middle manager.

It is an approach which is designed to capitalize on the success of previous programs, but to avoid their shortcomings. It is designed to encourage a modification of behavior and prejudicial attitude by building on the basically sound values of the military officer. The military middle manager is defined here as one who is responsible for the implementation of policy. In this sense both the senior non-commissioned officer and senior commissioned officer are sometimes considered as middle managers. Junior and middle grade officers to the O6 level are considered here, however, as the bulk of middle management.

The middle manager is targeted for particular concern because by definition and practice he is charged with the implementation of policy; and furthermore, because affirmative action policies designed to ensure equal opportunity for all minorities are likely to be successful only if they are supported by middle management.

Past Program Effectiveness

Evaluation of past programs is presently being conducted by the Systems Development Corporation of California. The areas of race relations education toward which they are particularly directing their attention are the Executive and UPWARDS seminars. These seminars are currently the major thrust of the Navy's race relations program. The objectives

of these programs are essentially two: first, to increase awareness of individual and institutional racism; second, to increase commitment to deal with racism through affirmative action.

By 30 September 1973, 185,000 E5 thru 06 personnel had attended UPWARD or Executive seminars.³ The evaluation of the impact of these programs in terms of their goals is not yet complete. In an interview with project analysts, however, it was learned that past efforts appear to have increased somewhat the awareness of racism.⁴

Prior Program Shortfalls

At this point in the evaluation of past programs it is not possible to demonstrate that the UPWARDS and Executive seminars have significantly increased commitment to deal affirmatively with racism.⁵ It is clear, however, that past programs were not primarily designed to provide skills for handling racial problems.

Furthermore, the approach taken by such programs has created a reaction among much of middle management which may have caused a lack of commitment to the intent of affirmative action. This reaction may be typified by the words of Admiral Hyman S. Rickover who said,

"Can you imagine what these paid vacations are doing to the readiness of ships that are already undermanned? The amateurish programs enacted thus

far by the Navy have been poorly conceived, poorly executed, are a joke in the fleet and are inimical to building a strong fighting force."

"Sociological experimentation of this nature, including group dynamics and sensitivity techniques, must not be permitted."

"A return to the more traditional concepts of competence in doing the job at hand, hard work, good example, and commonsense reasonableness, without sociologist interplay, is what is needed."⁶

A survey was conducted at the Naval War College to determine if the feelings expressed by Admiral Rickover reflected those of the Navy's middle manager. The survey utilized a Likert, six point, forced choice format. It was administered to the Naval officers of the class of 1974 at the War College. The main thrust and result of the survey will be briefly reviewed. A complete copy of the results is available from the author at the Naval War College.

Survey Results

- 148 Naval Officers responded
- 57 were CDRs or CAPTs, 91 were LCDRs or Senior LTs
- 10 were less than 30 years of age. 47 were between 30 and 34 years
- 53 were between 35-39 years. 40 were older than 40 yrs
- 98 officers had taken part in a race relations seminar
- 50 officers had not taken part in a race relations seminar

Six statements about Admiral Rickover's three paragraphs comment were directed to the respondents asking them to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. Our review of the results here will lump all degrees of agreement percentage for each category. The attached appendix gives a complete breakdown of the results and may be of considerable interest to some readers. These are preliminary breakdowns and further statistical analysis is currently being conducted.

Statement 1) "Overall this statement (Admiral Rickover's) concurs with my feelings about past Navy efforts with Human Goals Programs."

49 % (percents rounded) CDR/CAPTs agreed.
38 % LCDRs/LTs agreed
45 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
37.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
0 % under 30 years agreed, 49% between 30-34 yrs agreed
41.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 47.5 % over 40 yrs agreed

Statement 2) "Navy Human Goals programs have been 'amateurish, poorly conceived and poorly executed.'"

68.5 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 50% LCDR/LT agreed
58 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
55 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
30 % under 30 years agreed, 48% between 30-34 years agreed
66 % between 35-39 years agreed, 63% over 40 years agreed

Statement 3) "Navy Human Goals programs are a 'joke in the fleet.'"

36.5 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 38.5% LCDR/LT agreed
41 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
30.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
20 % under 30 years agreed, 45.5% between 30-34 yrs agreed
31.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 42% over 40 years agreed

Statement 4) "Paragraph number 2 expresses my view. ('Sociological experimentation')"

34 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 24% of LCDR/LT agreed.
29 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
25.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations agreed.
11 % under 30 years agreed, 26% between 30-34 years agreed.
27.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 22% over 40 years agreed

Statement 5) "Paragraph number 3 expresses my view. ('a return to more traditional concepts . . .')"

65 % CDR/CAPT agreed. 56% LCDR/LT agreed.
55 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed.
70 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed.
50 % under 30 years agreed, 58% between 30-34 agreed.
58.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 63% over 40 years agreed.

Statement 6) "This statement is aimed primarily at race-relations program."

66.5 % CDR/CAPT agreed. 58% LCDR/LT agreed.

Some Possible Conclusions.

It can be argued in a strict statistical sense that because Naval officers are selected for the War College they may not comprise a true random sample. These authors are inclined to argue, however, that in terms of attitudes and reactions War College attendees are a representative sample of the whole naval officer population of similar rank. We therefore believe the survey accurately represents a rather adverse reaction to past efforts and is worthy of note. This suggests that at least the following points can be tentatively concluded:

- 1) That a large percentage of naval management has misgivings about past programs especially with the way they were conducted. That senior officers have more misgivings than junior officers. That older officers have more misgivings than younger. That officers who have actual experience in Navy race relation programs have more misgivings than those who do not.

2) That most Naval officers are not against sociological efforts in the Navy.

3) That most officers desire a return to traditional concepts and values.

4) That most officers tend to equate Human Goals Programs to race relations efforts.

Identifying and Overcoming Middle Management Resistance

Probable Causes

It may be possible to identify five probable causes for middle management resistance to past race relations programs:

1) Some middle managers who are aware of their racial prejudices fear the potential exposure of their attitudes in the group process: some simply resist having the security of their prejudices disturbed.

2) The middle manager, particularly the officer, is uncomfortable in a seemingly confronting and often emotional group process which includes all enlisted rates and officer ranks.

3) The group process employed by some programs (UPWARD) often involves the normal work group of the participants. This tends to place the regular leaders (middle managers) of the group in unfamiliar and unsettling roles.

4) The middle manager perceives these programs as a challenge to his concept of leadership and as damaging to

"traditional" Navy discipline. He is, furthermore, reluctant to entertain a process which may appear to suggest abandoning what he believes to be a personally successful leadership formula.

5) The middle manager resists these programs because he is not yet convinced that a system exists which will reward the leadership behavior proposed by such programs.

Anxiety and Race Relations Education.

Personal anxiety may be at the core of the resistance of middle management to race-relations education. Our first three probable causes relate to this concept. It is hypothesized that the prejudiced middle manager is often threatened by current programs and as a result of raised anxieties can be expected to resist these programs.

The works of Rokeach, Adorno, and others deal with the personal anxiety experienced by prejudiced people. Rokeach, in his book entitled The Open and Closed Mind develops the concept of closed mindedness. He found a statistically significant relationship between this concept and anxiety.⁷ His work elaborated on that of Adorno et al. Adorno's several works analyzed the relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. A high correlation was found between them.⁸ Rokeach found that dogmatic or closed minded (prejudiced) individuals were more anxious and tended to have difficulty dealing with new ideas. Rokeach's dogmatic or closed minded individual is

similar to Adorno's authoritarian or dogmatic individual with one notable exception. Rokeach's concepts deal with individuals of all political persuasions. Adorno's original concept dealt only with the right and particularly with the anti-Semitic fascist.

Exposure

The group process format of past programs has tended to border on confrontation. A critical variable in this seems to have been the attitude of the facilitators.* Some facilitators direct their efforts toward making each participant "deal with" or "own up" to his prejudice. This environment of exposure is not comfortable for the anxious or threatened individual. He may well "own up" to his prejudices but that is no insurance that he will alter or control them. Programs which are perceived as confronting may well be restricting their success by turning off that participant who is most in need of the program.

Dr. James Thomas, a black researcher, instrumental in the Army's efforts in race relations, said in an interview that the Army believes it has come upon evidence of an actual

*These facilitators, however sincere, are perceived by many officers as unprepared to handle a group process dealing with such intense subjects as racism and prejudice. They are the products of a four week Navy School and do not always have any prior relevant background. Informal interviews conducted at the Naval War College suggest strongly that facilitator credentials may have increased skepticism about these programs among the officer corps.

hardening of prejudicial attitudes after training. He theorized that those persons who were open-minded may have benefited from the training while those who were closed minded or dogmatic may well have become more so.⁹ This kind of thinking tends to be supported by the work of Howland, Janis, and Kelly, whose extensive studies led them to state: "when the (emotion arousing) communication contains no reassurance or immediate way of obtaining reassurance then the emotional reaction may lead either to avoidance of thinking about the communication or to minimization of the importance of the communication."¹⁰

The anxious individual, therefore, can be expected to raise his defensive barriers and block confronting communication in a group process which threatens exposure of certain deep seated personality traits.

Family Work Group.

For the closed minded or anxious middle manager a group process which deals with racism and prejudice within his immediate work group becomes an ordeal. The patterns of relationships and leadership hierarchy which are developed over time are difficult to maintain. A group process which appears to impinge on these relationships is bound to be threatening to the manager. The recent work of D.J. Hanson and A.M. Bush supports this notion. Their studies, reported in the Psychological Reports, showed that anxiety created by situational threat increased closed mindedness.¹¹

This is important because it suggests that even those officers who are normally open minded may tend to become closed minded when placed in awkward or threatening situations. When the participants of a group process are of the same family work group the normal manager or leader of that group is in a new and threatening situation. This kind of confronting process might work with groups formed voluntarily and dedicated to solving problems of reasonable proportions. However, when these problems are buried deep inside the individual, when these problems relate to basic belief systems and where these problems are obscured by an overlay of emotion the confronting atmosphere of a family work group is not the answer. Awareness of the problem may be increased but an increased commitment to deal with it is not a likely outcome.

The Prejudiced Personality

Our first three probable causes have dealt with the relationship of anxiety and resistance created by threatening situations. It has also been suggested that the prejudiced person is likely to be anxious and resistant. Before proceeding to our final two probable causes a short discussion of some of the characteristics often exhibited by the prejudiced personality is appropriate here.

A variety of terms has been used to describe the prejudiced personality. These terms—dogmatic, authoritarian, closed minded — through not precisely synonymous, may be considered so for our purposes. Sanford's view of the authoritarian is usefully summarized into subparts. They are:

- 1) Conventionalism. Rigid adherence to conventional middleclass values.
- 2) Authoritarian Submission. Submission, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group.
- 3) Authoritarian Aggression. Tendency to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
- 4) Anti-intraception. Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tenderminded.
- 5) Superstition and Stereotype. The disposition to think in rigid categories.
- 6) Power and Toughness. Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension
- 7) Destructiveness and Cynicism.
- 8) Projectivity. The projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses.
- 9) Sex. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings on," and punitiveness toward violations of sex mores.¹²

An educational effort in an academic non-threatening environment which focuses on these personality characteristics might allow a useful process of internalization to ensue. Such a process should lead the middle manager to a better understanding of the specific components of his personal prejudices. Better understanding should help allay anxiety and thereby reduce his resistance to dealing with prejudice.

Leadership Contradiction

Two final causes for middle management resistance are cited here as existing in the unwillingness of military leaders to abandon the values and behavior of a leadership style which they perceive as (1) successful and as (2) rewarded.

The results of the survey conducted at the Naval War College showed that 65% of the senior officers and 56% of the junior officers polled agreed with Admiral Rickover's statement that,

"A return to the more traditional concepts of competence in doing the job at hand, hard work, good example, and commonsense reasonableness, without sociologist interplay, is what is needed."

The Hicks Congressional subcommittee report lends further support to this interpretation of middle management resistance. It stated as a finding,

". . . . obviously there has not been any removal of the tools to maintain discipline aboard ship or anywhere else in the Navy, but the attitude toward the use of such tools has changed.

The change in part has been occasioned by the use of minority affairs representatives, human relations councils and human resources staffs which too frequently bypass the chain of command."¹³

The Naval officer has an ingrained leadership value system which has been identified in two independent studies, one by G.W. England (University of Minnesota)¹⁴ and a second by A.L. Wermuth (Center for Advanced Studies and Analysis).¹⁵

Programs which tamper with a value system so pertinent to a manager's daily life are bound to raise resistance. Recently a visiting consultant at the Naval War College asked a class of senior students "what would you say if I told you I intended to show you how to lead!" One of the printable responses was "incredible."¹⁶ Effective leadership behavior is for some learned at great personal cost. Attempts to change it can expect to meet with resistance.

Decision Making

To be effective a race relations education program must be perceived not as threatening to but as relevant to leadership concepts. G.W. England, in his studies of naval officers' values, cites decision making ability as one of those traits most valued by Naval officers. Commitment to dealing constructively with prejudice might therefore be increased by associating it with being an effective decision-maker. Rokeach's concept of belief systems offers an excellent way for middle management to recognize the potential detriment of prejudice to good decision making. Rokeach asks rhetorically, "If we knew something about the way a person believes, is it possible to predict how he will go about solving problems that have nothing to do with his ideology?"¹⁷

Although Rokeach straightforwardly criticizes certain methodological shortcomings of some of the findings cited in

the Authoritarian Personality, he manifests considerable agreement on findings which pertain to the dynamics of decision making. In referring to the Adorno effort he states:

" . . . some major findings that come out of such studies are that persons who are high in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism, as compared with persons who are low, are more rigid in their problem-solving behavior, more concrete in their thinking, and more narrow in their grasp of a particular subject; they also have a greater tendency to premature closure in their perceptual processes and to distortions in memory, and a greater tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity."¹⁸

In a variety of experiments conducted to measure perceptual synthesis, Rokeach found considerable support for the hypothesis that prejudiced or closed minded persons have more difficulties in certain kinds of decision making or problem solving situations than do unprejudiced open minded individuals.¹⁹

These are vital points because they suggest that an effective race relations education program should deal with the dynamics of decision making. The behavior (decisions) of the prejudiced manager is likely to be made discriminatory by virtue of the decision making process he uses. It is precisely this sort of behavior that race relations education is designed to control. To be effective, an alternative approach must deal with the dynamics of decision making. Indeed, to ensure effectiveness an alternative approach to

race relations education should be made relevant to as many leadership values as possible.

Reward and Behavior

Relevancy is not, however, enough. Behavior modification is not likely to occur without the impetus of reward. Rudolph Winston of Harvard Business School (Dr. Winston is black and has done work in race relations for the U.S. Army) discussed at length in an interview at the Naval War College the relationship of reward to behavior change. He concluded his comments by saying emphatically "reward for change must be evident if change is to take place."²⁰ Dr. Wendy Wyatt, behavioral consultant for Associates for Human Resources Inc., stated recently that her experience both in industry and in the military indicates that change is likely to occur only when the reward-punishment system is perceived as encouraging change.²¹ The well known Porter and Lawler Model, which relates reward and the perceived probability of reward to performance, gives added credence to this concept.²²

Naval officers do not yet perceive that the "system" will reward human goals oriented behavior. Officer detailers at the Bureau of Naval Personnel generally do not encourage line officers to take human resource development billets unless they want to "take a chance with their careers." Senior officers associated with field activities known in the past as HRMC's

(Human Resource Management Centers) have been regularly passed over for the next rank while in such billets or prior to assignment to such billets. The Rear Admiral selection board just concluded did not nominate for the rank anyone with a specialty in the human resource management field. While no doubt justifiable on the basis of normal selection criteria, these actions are nonetheless often perceived as a failure of the system to reward concern in this field.

A race relations education program cannot of course ensure the middle manager that he will be rewarded for affirmative action. That is the purview of the military hierarchy. An education program might, however, succeed in relating concern for race relations to those leadership and management traits which the middle manager already perceived as being rewarded. This parallels and reinforces our efforts to make race relations education relevant to leadership.

We know, for example, from Wermuth's efforts that the Naval officer values organizational and battle efficiency.²³ He is assumed to perceive reward for attaining such efficiency. A program designed to demonstrate that race relations education is relevant to organizational efficiency should capture the attention of the military middle manager. Modern behavioral literature on the organization lends support to such efforts to relate prejudice to low personal achievement and contribution within the organization. Professor David C. McClelland, a well known organizational psychologist, has said,

"data show that lower-class Negro-Americans have a very low level of achievement need (n-ACH). This is not surprising. Society has systematically discouraged and blocked their achievement striving."²⁴ Professor David Bowers of the University of Michigan has made a related observation based on his research, "A management system which denies him (the individual) influence, appreciation, respect and confidence diminishes his motivation to be contributing member of the organization."²⁵

Hopefully a rationale of this sort will cause the middle manager to relate his leadership value system to the reward system in a manner which will reduce resistance to race relations education.

This paper has thus far examined some of the probable cause of middle management resistance to past race relations programs. It turns now to describe briefly what an alternative program might be.

An Alternative Approach

Objective

The objectives of an alternative race relations program must of course be compatible with the Navy Human Goals Plan. That is they must contribute to the determination of the Navy "to ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice

of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and eliminate individual and institutional racism." More specifically the education considered here will be targeted at the middle management population of the Navy. This population can be considered to be rationally versus emotionally oriented. The alternative approach would be based on an educational framework designed to avoid initial anxiety arousal. It would attempt to control communication avoidance and to maintain relevancy.

Behavior and Attitude

Every effort would be made to relate the entire process to the present value system of middle management and hopefully by extended logic to the perceived reward system. In this sense the program is not designed to alter present leadership values. It is designed rather to utilize those values to encourage both a behavioral and an attitudinal modification. The unemotional approach of the process allows the rationally oriented manager to see the contradiction between his leadership values and his prejudicial attitudes. This will hopefully lead to a modification of those attitudes. The practical case study aspect of the process should allow the manager to experiment with new behavior and relate it to the reward system. It should at the very least increase his confidence in dealing with racial problems and thus encourage a modification of behavior.

This paper wishes to avoid the debate of whether a race relations education program should be designed to alter attitude or behavior. Morally, one might wish that attitudes be changed; pragmatically changing behavior may be more feasible if only because it is more visible and measurable and therefore more subject to the reward system. C.A. Insko in concluding his comprehensive work, Theories of Attitude Change for the Century Psychology Series, states after an extensive review of the literature:

. . . from the present vantage point the most glaring weakness of contemporary theorizing is the lack of emphasis upon the relation between attitudes and behavior. A different approach to the relation between attitude and behavior is to concentrate not on behavior change following attitude change but on attitude change following behavior change.²⁶

Both for practical and theoretical reasons then, this paper suggests that an alternative approach to Race Relations should strive for both behavior and attitude modification, and not just attitude changes.

Two Aspects

An educational process designed to alleviate racism must deal with both the personal and societal aspects of prejudice. Simpson and Yinger give credence to this approach in their well known work Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination. They regard prejudice as a complex phenomenon resulting from various

societal structures and cultural norms. By this reasoning situational, cultural and personality inputs can be said to affect the learning and expression of intolerance.²⁷

Rokeach also establishes the distinction between two kinds of prejudice (1) that which results as an aspect of the personality trait closed mindedness and (2) that which is a matter of social and cultural norm.²⁸ G.W. Allport breaks down the dynamics of prejudice into a variety of societal and personality factors with special emphasis on the power of the group.²⁹ In a more specific but similar vein Professor J.C. Brigham, in recently discussing one important dimension of ethnic prejudice--stereotyping,--cited two causes for stereotyping and two potential cures. First, stereotypes are sometimes based on conformity and should be cured by reality oriented education. Second, stereotypes are also based on ego defense functions or personality and may be cured by insight.²⁹

Racism

Once the bases of racism--personal and societal prejudice--have been presented in an intellectual and relevant manner, the specifics of institutional and individual racism will be dealt with. Racism is often rationalized away on the bases of educational or talent differentials. To avoid this our alternative approach will first present a body of carefully

collected data which manifest the reality of racism in the Navy. Secondly, the dynamics of racism will be dealt with in the classic forms of position, influence and power denial. Thirdly, the manifestations and habits of racism such as avoidance, address, and assumption will be considered.

Skill Development

With the intellectual approach complete the middle manager will then be given an opportunity to deal with the problems of racism and equal opportunity through the case study method. This method allows the individual to compare his personal reactions with those of his peers, to obtain feedback relevant to his behavior, and to acquire practice and confidence in dealing with problems which involve race. Each case will be formed on a critical incident which has multiple complications and implications. The cases are not designed to scrutinize an officer's values or attitudes. They are designed rather to allow him to test his perceptions and behavior against some model solution. The model solution is not considered sacrosanct but it does give some basis for comparison.

In conjunction with the case study method, a decision making game designed to be run under the pressure of time and operational objectives is being developed. The decision game atmosphere is established with some competition in the environment to ensure that the middle manager personally wrestles with the concepts and difficulties of human oriented

management that is also mission directed. The considerable involvement with peers encouraged by this process should allow for some confrontation of ideas - but a controllable confrontation founded on a substantial amount of academic background. Confrontation can thus be resolved within some rational framework.

The decision game is designed furthermore to reward results. Results would be measured both in terms of the degree to which mission objectives are met and the cost of the human resource involved. A series of decisions would be called for in a build up phase, an incident phase, and a post incident phase. Each decision would have some bearing upon follow-on situations.

The case study method and the decision game are self educational in concept and are designed to give both the junior and senior officer practice with sensitive problems in a feedback environment. It is a way of moving from theory to application in a manner which hopefully will increase a leader's skill in handling emotionally charged situations and the change process itself. It should at least increase awareness of the limits of an individual's perception. In doing this there is some hope that better decisions will be made and fewer prejudices enacted into discrimination.

The administrators of the Human Goals Program at the United States Naval War College are attempting to mold this

suggestion for an alternative Approach to Race Relations Education into the overall Human Goals Program of the Naval War College in a manner which makes it compatible with the goals of that institution. If this is accomplished, an evaluation of its effectiveness is planned. Hopefully an evaluation will suggest that the integrated process suggested here will be worthy of consideration by other military institutions which deal primarily with the military middle manager or officer.

NOTES

1. OPNAVINST 5300.6, Navy Human Goals Plan, 6 August 1973, p. II-6.
2. Ibid., p. II-2.
3. Ibid.
4. Statement by Edward Emerson, telephone interview, January 21, 1974.
5. Ibid.
6. Admiral H.G. Rickover, is quoted by Navy Times, October 24, 1973.
7. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970) pp. 351-357.
8. T.W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality. (New York: Harper, 1950) p. 279.
9. Statement by Dr. James Thomas, personal interview, Washington, D.C., November 25, 1973.
10. C.A. Insko, Theories of Attitude Change, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), p. 35.
11. D.J. Hanson and Bush, "Anxiety and Dogmatism," Psychological Reports, October 1971, vol 29 (2).
12. J.P. Kirsht and R.C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 6.
13. United States Document, House of Representatives, "Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy." January 2, 1973 [HASC. No. 92-81]
14. G.W. England et al., Personal value systems and their relationship to administrative behavior simulations and perceptions of organizational effectiveness of Naval Officers. (The center for the study of organizational performance and human effectiveness, University of Minnesota) January 1972, pp. 25-39.

15. A.L. Wermuth, The Institutional Values of the Navy (Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Falls Church, Virginia, 1973) pp. 51-56.
16. Statement by Dr. Louis Desfosses, personal interview, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., February 17, 1974.
17. Rokeach, op. cit., p. 7.
18. Ibid., p. 16.
19. Ibid., pp. 267-269.
20. Statement by Dr. Rudolph Winston, personal interview, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., January 22, 1974.
21. Statement by Dr. Wendy Wyatt, personal interview, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., January 17, 1974.
22. L.W. Porter and E.E. Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and Performance, (Homewood, Ill. Irwin, Inc., 1968) p. 165.
23. Wermuth, op. cit., p. 52.
24. D.C. McClelland, Think Magazine, IBM 1966.
25. D.G. Bowers, System 4: The ideas of Renis Likert. (New York Basic Book in Press) p. 4.
26. Insko, op. cit., p. 348.
27. Kirscht & Dillehay, op. cit., p. 87
28. Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 132-168.
29. G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. (New York: Anchor Books, 1958) pp. 17-27.
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1974.

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

RANK

CAPT-CDR

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	RANK	CAPT-CDR
1	1	57	100.00	100.00	1	CAPT, CDR
	2	0	0.00	100.00		2) LCDR, LT.
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	57				
2	1	0	0.00	0.00	AGE	1) LESS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE.
	2	0	0.00	0.00		
	3	21	36.84	36.84		
	4	36	63.16	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	57				
3	1	41	71.93	71.93	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
	2	16	28.07	100.00	1) YES 2) NO	
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	57				
4	1	6	16.53	16.53	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH	
	2	14	24.56	35.09	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	3	9	15.79	50.88		
	4	14	24.56	75.44		
	5	10	17.54	92.98		
	6	4	7.02	100.00		
	---	57				
5	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.6					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
6	1	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY	
	2	10	17.54	17.54	EXECUTED.#	
	3	8	14.04	31.58		
	4	19	33.33	64.91		
	5	11	19.30	84.21		
	6	9	15.79	100.00		
	---	57				
7	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
8	1	2	3.64	3.64	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
	2	22	40.00	43.64		
	3	11	20.00	63.64		
	4	12	21.82	85.45		
	5	5	9.09	94.55		
	6	3	5.45	100.00		
	---	55				
9	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
10	1	5	8.77	8.77	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	8	14.04	22.81		
	3	8	14.04	36.84		
	4	16	28.07	64.91		
	5	9	15.79	80.70		
	6	11	19.30	100.00		
	---	56				
11	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
12	1	3	5.45	5.45	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	11	20.00	25.45		
	3	5	9.09	34.55		
	4	12	21.82	56.36		
	5	20	36.36	92.73		
	6	4	7.27	100.00		
	---	55				
13	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
14	1	3	5.45	5.45	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	11	20.00	25.45		
	3	5	9.09	34.55		
	4	12	21.82	56.36		
	5	20	36.36	92.73		
	6	4	7.27	100.00		
	---	55				
15	STRONGLY AGREE					
	AGREE					
	SLIGHTLY AGREE					
	DISAGREE					
	STRONGLY DISAGREE					
16	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

RANK

LCDR-LT

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	RANK	LCDR-LT
1	1	6	0.00	0.00	1) CAPT, CDR	2) LCDR, LT.
	2	91	100.00	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	91				
2	1	10	10.99	10.99	AGE	1) LFSS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE.
	2	47	51.65	62.64		
	3	32	35.16	97.80		
	4	2	2.20	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	91				
3	1	57	62.64	62.64	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
	2	34	37.36	100.00	1) YES	2) NO
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	91				
4	1	13	14.94	14.94	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	2	24	27.59	42.53		
	3	17	19.54	62.57		
	4	17	19.54	81.61		
	5	11	12.64	94.25		
	6	5	5.75	100.00		
	---	91				
	87					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
5	1	7	7.78	7.78	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#	
	2	21	23.33	31.11		
	3	17	18.89	50.00		
	4	18	20.00	70.00		
	5	21	23.33	93.33		
	6	6	6.67	100.00		
	---	91				
	9n					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.65					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
6	1	13	14.77	14.77	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
	2	27	36.68	45.45		
	3	14	15.91	61.36		
	4	21	23.86	85.23		
	5	1^	11.36	96.59		
	6	3	3.41	100.00		
	---	91				
	88					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
7	1	19	21.84	21.84	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	32	36.78	58.62		
	3	15	17.24	75.86		
	4	14	16.09	91.95		
	5	3	3.45	95.40		
	6	4	4.60	100.00		
	---	91				
	87					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.6					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
8	1	8	8.99	8.99	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	19	21.35	30.34		
	3	12	13.48	43.82		
	4	15	16.85	60.67		
	5	24	26.97	87.64		
	6	11	12.36	100.00		
	---	91				
	89					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
9	1	7	8.24	8.24	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	25	29.41	37.65		
	3	4	4.71	42.35		
	4	12	14.12	56.47		
	5	26	35.59	87.86		
	6	11	12.94	100.00		
	---	91				
	85					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
	STRONGLY AGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	
	AGREE		DISAGREE		DISAGREE	
	6		5		4	
					3	
					2	
					1	

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT		YES	
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT		
1	1	41	41.84	41.84	RANK 1)CAPT+CDR 2)LCDR+LT.	
	2	57	58.16	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	98				
2	1	6	6.12	6.12	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.	
	2	29	29.59	35.71		
	3	35	35.71	71.43		
	4	28	28.57	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	98				
3	1	98	100.00	100.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR. 1)YES 2)NO	
	2	0	0.00	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	98				
4	1	12	12.50	12.50	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	2	27	28.12	40.62		
	3	14	14.58	55.21		
	4	19	19.79	75.00		
	5	16	16.67	91.67		
	6	8	8.33	100.00		
	---	98				
5	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
5	1	5	5.10	5.10	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.*	
	2	21	21.43	26.53		
	3	15	15.31	41.84		
	4	22	22.45	64.29		
	5	21	20.41	84.69		
	6	15	15.31	100.00		
	---	98				
6	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
6	1	12	12.37	12.37	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.*	
	2	29	29.70	42.27		
	3	16	16.49	58.76		
	4	23	23.71	82.47		
	5	11	11.34	93.81		
	6	6	6.19	100.00		
	---	98				
7	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
7	1	20	20.83	20.83	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	32	33.33	54.17		
	3	16	16.67	70.83		
	4	15	15.62	86.46		
	5	7	7.29	93.75		
	6	6	6.25	100.00		
	---	96				
8	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
8	1	11	11.46	11.46	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	20	25.83	32.29		
	3	14	14.58	46.87		
	4	15	15.62	62.50		
	5	20	20.83	83.33		
	6	16	16.67	100.00		
	---	94				
9	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.6 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7					
9	1	8	8.70	8.70	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	20	21.74	30.43		
	3	8	8.70	39.13		
	4	15	16.30	55.43		
	5	30	32.61	88.04		
	6	11	11.96	100.00		
	---	92				
9	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
9	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	6	5	4	3	2	1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT

NO

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT		
					RANK	1) CAPT+CDR 2) LCDR+LT.
1	1	16	32.00	32.00		
	2	34	68.00	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
					50	

2	1	4	8.00	8.00	AGE	1) LESS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE,
	2	18	36.00	44.00		
	3	18	36.00	80.00		
	4	10	20.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
					50	

3	1	0	0.00	0.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
	2	50	100.00	100.00	1) YES 2) NO	
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
					50	

4	1	7	14.58	14.58	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	2	11	22.92	37.50		
	3	12	25.00	62.50		
	4	12	25.00	87.50		
	5	5	15.42	97.92		
	6	1	2.08	100.00		
					50	

48
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3

5	1	2	4.08	4.08	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#	
	2	10	27.41	24.49		
	3	10	26.41	44.90		
	4	15	36.61	75.51		
	5	12	24.49	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
					50	

49
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.2

6	1	3	6.52	6.52	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
	2	20	43.48	50.00		
	3	9	19.57	69.57		
	4	10	21.74	91.30		
	5	4	8.70	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
					50	

46
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1

7	1	8	17.02	17.02	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	17	36.17	53.19		
	3	10	21.28	74.47		
	4	7	14.89	89.36		
	5	2	6.38	95.74		
	6	2	4.26	100.00		
					50	

47
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3

8	1	2	4.00	4.00	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	7	14.00	18.00		
	3	6	12.00	30.00		
	4	16	32.00	62.00		
	5	13	26.00	88.00		
	6	6	12.00	100.00		
					50	

50
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3

9	1	2	4.17	4.17	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	16	33.33	37.50		
	3	1	2.08	39.58		
	4	9	18.75	58.33		
	5	16	33.33	91.67		
	6	4	8.33	100.00		
					50	

48
 THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7
 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5

STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY DISAGREE DISAGREE

6 5 4 3 2 1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			AGE	LESS THAN 30	
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	CUM PRCNT		
1	0	0.00	0.00	RANK	1) CAPT+CDR 2) LCDR+LT.
2	10	100.00	100.00		
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
2	10	100.00	100.00	AGE	1) LESS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE.
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
3	6	60.00	60.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
2	4	40.00	100.00	1) YES 2) NO	
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
4	2	20.00	20.00	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH	
3	3	30.00	50.00	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
5	5	50.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.3				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 0.8				
5	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY	
2	5	50.00	50.00	EXECUTED.#	
3	2	20.00	70.00		
4	3	30.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 0.9				
6	2	20.00	20.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
2	4	40.00	60.00		
3	2	20.00	80.00		
4	2	20.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.4				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1				
7	2	22.22	22.22	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
2	4	44.44	66.67		
3	2	22.22	88.89		
4	1	11.11	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	9			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.2				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.0				
8	0	0.00	0.00	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
2	2	20.00	20.00		
3	3	30.00	50.00		
4	3	30.00	80.00		
5	2	20.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	10			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1				
9	2	20.00	20.00	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
2	3	30.00	50.00		
3	1	10.00	60.00		
4	2	20.00	80.00		
5	1	10.00	90.00		
6	1	10.00	100.00		
	---	10			
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7				

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

AGE

30-34

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	RANK	1) CAPT.CDR	2) LCDR.LT.
1	1	0	0.00	0.00			
	2	47	100.00	100.00			
	3	0	0.00	100.00			
	4	0	0.00	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			

		47					
2	1	0	0.00	0.00	AGE	1) LESS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE,	
	2	47	100.00	100.00			
	3	0	0.00	100.00			
	4	0	0.00	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			

		47					
3	1	29	61.70	61.70	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.		
	2	18	38.30	100.00	1) YES, 2) NO		
	3	0	0.00	100.00			
	4	0	0.00	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			

		47					
4	1	6	13.95	13.95	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH		
	2	13	35.23	49.19	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.		
	3	3	6.98	51.16			
	4	9	25.93	72.09			
	5	9	25.93	93.02			
	6	3	6.98	100.00			

		43					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.3						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6						
5	1	5	10.87	10.87	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY		
	2	8	17.39	28.26	EXECUTED.#		
	3	11	23.91	52.17			
	4	5	15.87	63.64			
	5	14	37.43	93.48			
	6	3	6.98	100.00			

		46					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5						
6	1	6	13.64	13.64	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#		
	2	11	25.00	38.64			
	3	7	15.91	54.55			
	4	12	27.27	81.82			
	5	6	13.64	95.45			
	6	2	4.55	100.00			

		44					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4						
7	1	9	19.57	19.57	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	2	16	34.78	54.35			
	3	9	19.57	73.91			
	4	8	17.39	91.30			
	5	1	2.17	93.48			
	6	3	6.52	100.00			

		46					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4						
8	1	3	6.67	6.67	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	2	11	24.44	31.11			
	3	5	11.11	42.22			
	4	3	6.67	48.89			
	5	14	31.11	80.00			
	6	9	20.00	100.00			

		45					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 5						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7						
9	1	3	6.98	6.98	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.		
	2	12	27.91	34.88			
	3	3	6.98	41.86			
	4	4	9.30	51.16			
	5	15	34.88	86.05			
	6	6	13.95	100.00			

		43					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				STRONGLY		
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5				AGREE		
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8				SLIGHTLY		
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7				DISAGREE		
					STRONGLY		
					DISAGREE		
						1	

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

AGE

35-39

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	RANK	AGE	1) CAPT, CDR	2) LCDR, LT.
1	1	21	39.62	39.62				
	2	32	60.38	100.00				
	3	0	0.00	100.00				
	4	0	0.00	100.00				
	5	0	0.00	100.00				
	6	0	0.00	100.00				
		53						
2					1)	LESS THAN 30, 2) 30-34, 3) 35-39, 4) 40 OR MORE		
	1	0	0.00	0.00				
	2	0	0.00	0.00				
	3	53	100.00	100.00				
	4	0	0.00	100.00				
	5	0	0.00	100.00				
	6	0	0.00	100.00				
		53						
3					1)	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.		
	1	35	66.04	66.04	2)	NO		
	2	18	33.96	100.00				
	3	0	0.00	100.00				
	4	0	0.00	100.00				
	5	0	0.00	100.00				
	6	0	0.00	100.00				
		53						
4					1)	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.		
	1	7	13.21	13.21				
	2	12	22.64	35.85				
	3	12	22.64	58.49				
	4	13	24.53	83.02				
	5	6	11.32	94.34				
	6	3	5.66	100.00				
		53						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4							
5					1)	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#		
	1	2	3.77	3.77				
	2	9	16.98	20.75				
	3	7	13.21	33.96				
	4	18	33.96	67.92				
	5	11	21.75	88.68				
	6	6	11.32	100.00				
		53						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4							
6					1)	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#		
	1	4	7.84	7.84				
	2	21	41.18	49.62				
	3	10	19.61	68.63				
	4	8	15.69	84.31				
	5	6	11.76	96.68				
	6	2	3.92	100.00				
		51						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.9							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3							
7					1)	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	1	14	19.61	19.61				
	2	19	37.25	56.86				
	3	8	15.69	72.55				
	4	8	15.69	88.24				
	5	4	7.84	96.68				
	6	2	3.92	100.00				
		51						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4							
8					1)	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	1	5	9.43	9.43				
	2	10	18.87	28.30				
	3	7	13.21	41.51				
	4	13	24.53	66.76				
	5	12	22.64	88.68				
	6	6	11.32	100.00				
		53						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5							
9					1)	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.		
	1	2	3.92	3.92				
	2	14	27.45	31.37				
	3	3	5.88	37.25				
	4	11	21.57	58.82				
	5	15	29.41	88.24				
	6	6	11.76	100.00				
		51						
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5							
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8							
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5							
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	DISAGREE		
	6	5	4	3	2	1		

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY

AGE

40 OR MORE

QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	AGE						40 OR MORE						
					1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	
1	1	36	94.74	94.74	RANK	1)CAPT,CDR	2)LCDR,LT.										
	2	2	5.26	100.00													
	3	0	0.00	100.00													
	4	0	0.00	100.00													
	5	0	0.00	100.00													
	6	0	0.00	100.00													
					38												
2	1	0	0.00	0.00	AGE	1)LESS THAN 30,	2)30-34,	3)35-39,	4)40 OR MORE.								
	2	0	0.00	0.00													
	3	0	0.00	0.00													
	4	38	100.00	100.00													
	5	0	0.00	100.00													
	6	0	0.00	100.00													
					38												
3	1	28	73.68	73.68	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.												
	2	10	26.32	100.00	1)YES	2)NO											
	3	0	0.00	100.00													
	4	0	0.00	100.00													
	5	0	0.00	100.00													
	6	0	0.00	100.00													
					38												
4	1	4	15.53	10.53	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH												
	2	10	26.32	36.44	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.												
	3	6	15.79	52.63													
	4	9	23.68	76.32													
	5	6	15.79	92.11													
	6	3	7.89	100.00													
					38												
					THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3												
					THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2												
					THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.3												
					THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5												
5	1	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY												
	2	9	23.68	23.68	EXECUTED.*												
	3	5	13.16	36.84													
	4	11	28.95	65.79													
	5	7	18.42	84.21													
	6	6	15.79	100.00													
					38												
					THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4												
					THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4												
					THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9												
					THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4												
6	1	3	7.89	7.89	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.*												
	2	13	34.21	42.11													
	3	6	15.79	57.89													
	4	11	28.95	86.84													
	5	3	7.89	94.74													
	6	2	5.26	100.00													
					38												
					THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3												
					THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2												
					THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1												
					THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3												
7	1	7	18.92	18.92	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.												
	2	14	27.03	45.95													
	3	7	18.92	64.86													
	4	5	13.51	78.18													
	5	5	13.51	91.89													
	6	3	8.11	100.00													
					37												
					THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3												
					THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2												
					THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0												
					THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6												
8	5	13.16	13.16	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.													
	4	15.53	23.68														
	5	13.16	36.84														
	12	31.58	68.42														
	5	13.16	81.58														
	7	18.42	100.00														
					38												
					THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4												
					THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4												
					THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8												
					THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6												
9	3	8.33	8.33	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.													
	7	19.44	27.78														
	2	5.56	33.33														
	7	19.44	52.78														
	15	41.67	94.44														
	2	5.56	100.00														
					STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE							
					6	5	4	3	2	1							

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY				RANK	CAPT-CDR
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	
1	1	57	100.00	100.00	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
	2	0	0.00	100.00	
	3	0	0.00	100.00	
	4	0	0.00	100.00	
	5	0	0.00	100.00	
	6	0	0.00	100.00	
	----	57			
2	1	0	0.00	0.00	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.
	2	0	0.00	0.00	
	3	21	36.84	36.84	
	4	36	63.16	100.00	
	5	0	0.00	100.00	
	6	0	0.00	100.00	
	----	57			
3	1	41	71.93	71.93	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR. 1)YES, 2)NO
	2	16	28.07	100.00	
	3	0	0.00	100.00	
	4	0	0.00	100.00	
	5	0	0.00	100.00	
	6	0	0.00	100.00	
	----	57			
4	1	6	15.53	15.53	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
	2	14	24.56	35.89	
	3	9	15.79	50.88	
	4	14	24.56	75.44	
	5	10	17.54	92.98	
	6	4	7.02	100.00	
	----	57			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.4				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5				
5	1	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#
	2	10	17.54	17.54	
	3	8	14.04	31.58	
	4	19	33.33	64.91	
	5	11	19.39	84.21	
	6	9	15.79	100.00	
	----	57			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3				
6	1	2	3.64	3.64	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#
	2	22	40.00	43.84	
	3	11	20.00	63.64	
	4	12	21.82	85.45	
	5	5	9.09	94.55	
	6	3	5.45	100.00	
	----	57			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3				
7	1	9	16.07	16.07	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
	2	17	31.36	46.43	
	3	11	19.34	66.87	
	4	8	14.29	80.36	
	5	7	12.50	92.86	
	6	4	7.14	100.00	
	----	57			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5				
8	1	5	8.77	8.77	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
	2	6	14.04	22.81	
	3	6	14.04	36.84	
	4	10	28.07	64.91	
	5	9	15.79	80.70	
	6	11	19.39	100.00	
	----	57			
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6				
9	1	3	5.45	5.45	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
	2	11	20.00	25.45	
	3	5	9.09	34.55	
	4	12	21.82	56.36	
	5	20	36.36	92.73	
	6	4	7.27	100.00	
	----	57			
	STRONGLY AGREE AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE SLIGHTLY DISAGREE DISAGREE STRONGLY DISAGREE				
	55				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5				
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9				
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4				

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			RANK	LCDR-LT			
SPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT				
1	6	0.00	0.00	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.			
2	91	100.00	100.00				
3	n	0.00	100.00				
4	n	0.00	100.00				
5	n	0.00	100.00				
6	n	0.00	100.00				

91							
1	10	10.99	10.99	AGE 1)LFSS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.			
2	47	51.65	62.64				
3	32	35.16	97.80				
4	2	2.20	100.00				
5	n	0.00	100.00				
6	n	0.00	100.00				

91							
1	57	62.64	62.64	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.			
2	34	37.36	100.00	1)YES, 2)NO			
3	n	0.00	100.00				
4	n	0.00	100.00				
5	n	0.00	100.00				
6	n	0.00	100.00				

91							
1	13	14.94	14.94	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.			
2	24	27.59	42.53				
3	17	19.54	62.87				
4	17	19.54	81.61				
5	11	12.64	94.25				
6	5	5.75	100.00				

87							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5							
1	7	7.78	7.78	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED, AND POORLY EXECUTED.#			
2	21	23.33	31.11				
3	17	18.89	50.00				
4	18	20.00	70.00				
5	21	23.33	93.33				
6	6	6.67	100.00				

91							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4							
1	13	14.77	14.77	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET#.			
2	27	30.68	45.45				
3	14	15.91	61.36				
4	21	23.86	85.23				
5	1	11.36	96.59				
6	3	3.41	100.00				

88							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4							
1	19	21.84	21.84	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.			
2	32	36.78	58.62				
3	15	17.24	75.86				
4	14	16.09	91.95				
5	3	3.45	95.40				
6	4	4.60	100.00				

87							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.6							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3							
1	8	8.99	8.99	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.			
2	19	21.35	30.34				
3	12	13.48	43.82				
4	15	16.85	60.67				
5	24	26.97	87.64				
6	11	12.30	100.00				

89							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6							
1	7	8.24	8.24	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.			
2	25	29.41	37.65				
3	4	4.71	42.35				
4	12	14.12	56.47				
5	26	37.57	87.66				
6	17	12.94	100.00				

85							
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4							
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5							
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7							
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6							
1	6	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
2	5						
3	4						
4	3						
5	2						
6	1						

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT		YES		
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	CUM PRCNT	PRCNT			
1	1	41	41.84	41.84	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.		
	2	57	58.16	100.00			
	3	0	0.00	100.00			
	4	0	0.00	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			
		98					
2	1	6	6.12	6.12	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)31-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.		
	2	29	29.59	35.71			
	3	35	35.71	71.43			
	4	28	28.57	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			
		98					
3	1	98	100.00	100.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR. 1)YES 2)NO		
	2	0	0.00	100.00			
	3	0	0.00	100.00			
	4	0	0.00	100.00			
	5	0	0.00	100.00			
	6	0	0.00	100.00			
		98					
4	1	12	12.50	12.50	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.		
	2	27	28.12	46.62			
	3	14	14.58	55.21			
	4	19	19.79	75.00			
	5	16	16.67	91.67			
	6	8	8.33	100.00			
		96					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5						
5	1	5	5.10	5.10	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURSH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.*		
	2	21	21.43	26.53			
	3	15	15.31	41.84			
	4	22	22.45	64.29			
	5	20	20.61	84.59			
	6	15	15.31	100.00			
		98					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5						
6	1	12	12.37	12.37	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.*		
	2	29	29.90	42.27			
	3	16	16.49	58.76			
	4	23	23.71	82.47			
	5	11	11.34	93.81			
	6	6	6.19	100.00			
		97					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4						
7	1	20	20.83	20.83	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	2	32	33.33	54.17			
	3	16	16.67	70.83			
	4	15	15.62	86.46			
	5	7	7.29	93.75			
	6	6	6.25	100.00			
		96					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5						
8	1	11	11.46	11.46	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.		
	2	20	20.83	32.29			
	3	14	14.58	46.87			
	4	15	15.62	62.50			
	5	20	20.83	83.33			
	6	16	16.67	100.00			
		94					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.6						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7						
9	1	8	8.70	8.70	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.		
	2	20	21.74	30.43			
	3	8	8.70	39.13			
	4	15	16.30	55.43			
	5	30	32.61	80.04			
	6	11	11.96	100.00			
		92					
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4						
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5						
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8						
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6						
		STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
		6	5	4	3	2	1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT		NO	
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT		
1	1	16	32.00	32.00	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.	
	2	34	68.00	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	50				
2	1	4	8.00	8.00	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.	
	2	18	36.00	44.00		
	3	18	36.00	80.00		
	4	10	20.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	50				
3	1	0	0.00	0.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
	2	50	100.00	100.00	1)YES 2)NO	
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	50				
4	1	7	14.58	14.58	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	2	11	22.92	37.50		
	3	12	25.00	62.50		
	4	12	25.00	87.50		
	5	5	15.42	97.92		
	6	1	2.08	100.00		
	---	48				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
5	1	2	4.08	4.08	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH, POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#	
	2	10	20.41	24.49		
	3	10	20.41	44.90		
	4	15	31.61	75.51		
	5	12	24.49	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	49				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.2					
6	1	3	6.52	6.52	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
	2	20	43.48	50.00		
	3	9	19.57	69.57		
	4	10	21.74	91.30		
	5	4	8.70	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	46				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1					
7	1	8	17.02	17.02	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	17	36.17	53.19		
	3	10	21.28	74.47		
	4	7	14.89	89.36		
	5	4	6.34	95.74		
	6	2	4.26	100.00		
	---	47				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
8	1	2	4.00	4.00	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	7	14.00	18.00		
	3	6	12.00	30.00		
	4	16	32.00	62.00		
	5	13	26.00	88.00		
	6	6	12.00	100.00		
	---	50				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
9	1	2	4.17	4.17	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	16	33.33	37.50		
	3	1	2.08	39.58		
	4	9	18.75	58.33		
	5	16	33.33	91.67		
	6	4	8.33	100.00		
	---	48				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5 THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7 THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	6	5	4	3	2	1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			AGE	LESS THAN 30				
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT				
1	0	0	0.00	0.00	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.			
2	10	100.00	100.00					
3	0	0.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
2	10	100.00	100.00	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.				
1	10	100.00	100.00					
2	0	0.00	100.00					
3	0	0.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
3	6	60.00	60.00	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.				
2	4	40.00	100.00	1)YES 2)NO				
3	0	0.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
4	2	20.00	20.00	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.				
2	3	30.00	50.00					
3	5	50.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.3								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 0.8								
5	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH,PoorLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#				
2	5	50.00	50.00					
3	2	20.00	70.00					
4	3	30.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 0.9								
6	2	20.00	20.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#				
2	4	40.00	60.00					
3	2	20.00	80.00					
4	2	20.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.4								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1								
7	2	22.22	22.22	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.				
2	4	44.44	66.67					
3	2	22.22	88.89					
4	1	11.11	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	9						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.2								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.0								
8	0	0.00	0.00	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.				
2	2	20.00	20.00					
3	3	30.00	50.00					
4	3	30.00	80.00					
5	2	20.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	----	10						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1								
9	2	20.00	20.00	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.				
2	3	30.00	50.00					
3	1	10.00	60.00					
4	2	20.00	80.00					
5	1	10.00	90.00					
6	1	10.00	100.00					
	----	10						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7								
			STRONGLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	
			6	5	4	3	2	1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY				AGE	30-34
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	CUM PRCNT		
1	0	0.00	0.00	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.	
2	47	100.00	100.00		
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		

	47				
2	0	0.00	0.00	AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.	
1	47	100.00	100.00		
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		

	47				
3	29	61.70	61.70	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
2	18	38.30	100.00	1)YES 2)NO	
3	0	0.00	100.00		
4	0	0.00	100.00		
5	0	0.00	100.00		
6	0	0.00	100.00		

	47				
4	6	13.95	13.95	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
2	13	37.23	44.19		
3	3	6.98	51.16		
4	9	25.93	72.89		
5	9	25.93	93.62		
6	3	6.98	100.00		

	43				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.3					
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
5	5	10.87	10.87	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#	
2	8	17.39	28.26		
3	11	23.91	52.17		
4	5	15.87	63.84		
5	14	37.43	93.48		
6	3	6.52	100.00		

	46				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5					
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
6	6	13.64	13.64	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
2	11	25.00	38.64		
3	7	15.91	54.55		
4	12	27.27	81.82		
5	6	13.64	95.45		
6	2	6.52	100.00		

	44				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2					
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
7	9	19.57	19.57	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
2	16	34.78	54.35		
3	9	19.57	79.91		
4	8	17.39	91.30		
5	1	2.17	93.48		
6	3	6.52	100.00		

	46				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2					
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7					
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
8	3	6.67	6.67	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
2	11	24.44	31.11		
3	5	11.11	42.22		
4	3	6.67	48.89		
5	14	31.11	80.00		
6	9	26.00	100.00		

	45				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 5					
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5					
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9					
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7					
9	3	6.98	6.98	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
2	12	27.91	34.88		
3	3	6.98	41.86		
4	4	9.30	51.16		
5	15	34.88	86.65		
6	6	13.95	100.00		

	43				
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4				STRONGLY AGREE	
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5				AGREE	
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8				SLIGHTLY AGREE	
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7				SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	
				DISAGREE	
				STRONGLY DISAGREE	
			6	5	4
				3	2
				1	

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY			AGE	35-39				
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT				
1	21	39.62	39.62	RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.				
2	32	60.38	100.00					
3	0	0.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	---	53						
2	1	0	0.00	0.00 AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.				
2	0	0	0.00	0.00				
3	53	100.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	---	53						
3	1	35	66.04	66.04 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.				
2	18	33.96	100.00	1)YES .2)NO				
3	0	0.00	100.00					
4	0	0.00	100.00					
5	0	0.00	100.00					
6	0	0.00	100.00					
	---	53						
4	1	7	13.21	13.21 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.				
2	12	22.64	35.85					
3	12	22.64	58.49					
4	13	24.53	83.02					
5	6	11.32	94.34					
6	3	5.66	100.00					
	---	53						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4								
5	1	2	3.77	3.77 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY EXECUTED.#				
2	9	16.98	20.75					
3	7	13.21	33.96					
4	18	33.96	67.92					
5	11	21.75	88.68					
6	6	11.32	100.00					
	---	53						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4								
6	1	4	7.84	7.84 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#				
2	21	41.18	49.02					
3	10	19.61	68.63					
4	8	15.69	84.31					
5	6	11.76	96.08					
6	2	3.92	100.00					
	---	51						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.9								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3								
7	1	14	19.61	19.61 PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.				
2	19	37.25	56.86					
3	8	15.69	72.55					
4	8	15.69	88.24					
5	4	7.84	96.08					
6	2	3.92	100.00					
	---	51						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4								
8	1	5	9.43	9.43 PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.				
2	16	18.87	28.30					
3	7	13.21	41.51					
4	13	24.53	66.54					
5	12	22.64	88.68					
6	6	11.32	100.00					
	---	53						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5								
9	1	2	3.92	3.92 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.				
2	14	27.45	31.37					
3	3	5.88	37.25					
4	11	21.57	58.82					
5	15	29.61	88.24					
6	6	11.76	100.00					
	---	51						
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4								
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5								
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8								
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5								
			STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
			6	5	4	3	2	1

HUMAN GOALS SURVEY				AGE	40 OR MORE	
QUESTION	RESPONSE	NUMBER RESPONDING	PRCNT	CUM PRCNT	RANK	
1	1	36	94.74	94.74	1)CAPT+CDR	2)LCDR+LT.
	2	2	5.26	100.00		
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	38				
2	1	0	0.00	0.00	AGE	1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34, 3)35-39, 4)40 OR MORE.
	2	0	0.00	0.00		
	3	0	0.00	0.00		
	4	38	100.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	38				
3	1	28	73.68	73.68	I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.	
	2	10	26.32	100.00	1)YES	2)NO
	3	0	0.00	100.00		
	4	0	0.00	100.00		
	5	0	0.00	100.00		
	6	0	0.00	100.00		
	---	38				
4	1	4	15.53	10.53	OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH	
	2	10	26.32	36.84	HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.	
	3	6	15.79	52.63		
	4	9	23.68	76.32		
	5	6	15.79	92.11		
	6	3	7.89	100.00		
	---	38				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.3					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5					
5	1	0	0.00	0.00	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN #AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY	
	2	9	23.68	23.68	EXECUTED.#	
	3	5	13.16	36.84		
	4	11	28.95	65.79		
	5	7	18.42	84.21		
	6	6	15.79	100.00		
	---	38				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4					
6	1	3	7.89	7.89	NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A #JOKE IN THE FLEET.#	
	2	13	34.21	42.11		
	3	6	15.79	57.89		
	4	11	28.95	86.84		
	5	3	7.89	94.74		
	6	2	5.26	100.00		
	---	38				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3					
7	1	7	18.92	18.92	PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	10	27.03	45.95		
	3	7	18.92	64.86		
	4	5	13.51	78.78		
	5	5	13.51	91.89		
	6	3	8.11	100.00		
	---	37				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
8	1	5	13.16	13.16	PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.	
	2	4	17.53	23.68		
	3	5	13.16	36.84		
	4	12	31.58	68.42		
	5	5	13.16	81.58		
	6	7	18.42	100.00		
	---	38				
	THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4					
	THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8					
	THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6					
9	1	3	8.33	8.33	THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.	
	2	7	19.44	27.78		
	3	2	5.56	33.33		
	4	7	19.44	52.78		
	5	15	41.67	94.44		
	6	2	5.56	100.00		
	---	36				
	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	6	5	4	3	2	1